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THE MAP IS NOT THE TERRITORY: 
 
HOW SOUTH AFRICA FOLLOWED 
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION ROADMAP AND 




ABSTRACT: The past thirty years have seen the emergence of a 
global consensus against corruption. Work has been done in order to 
quantify why corruption is harmful; countries have moved from con-
sidering bribes paid to foreign officials as tax deductible to outlawing 
such bribes; and non-governmental agencies have proliferated, creat-
ing widely followed measurements and indices of corruption.  In 
short, corruption has been identified, tracked, highlighted, spoken 
about, agreed upon, and discussed as frequently as topics such as 
globalization, disease and poverty. 
All this has led to the emergence of a global consensus or 
“roadmap” for fighting corruption.  This roadmap, which finds ex-
pression in multilateral conventions and treaties, and the domestic 
legislation they give rise to, prescribes combating corruption with a 
requiem of strong anti-corruption laws, independent institutions for 
prosecuting and investigating, strict standards governing the behavior 
of public officials and the management of public funds, bi-lateral 
commitments to international cooperation through legal assistance 
and extradition, and laws protecting the right of access to infor-
mation.  Countries following this roadmap should, in theory, see a 
reduction in corruption. 
Yet this has not always been the case, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Despite the presence of laws and protocols, corrup-
tion seems in fact to have worsened. 
This paper charts the development of the anti-corruption 
roadmap and considers whether it has been effective in South Africa.  
Part I begins with an overview of the FCPA, the first and most influ-
ential anticorruption law.  Part II reviews the multilateral treaties and 
conventions that proliferated in the 1990s and early 2000s and that 
outline the contemporary anticorruption roadmap.  Part III focuses 
on the efforts of South Africa to follow the roadmap, and reviews 
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the laws and institutions it established after acceding to the instru-
ments and treaties described in Part II.  Part IV looks at what hap-
pened next, summarizing four major corruption scandals that have 
occurred in South Africa in recent years.  Part V considers those 
scandals through the lens o f  the laws and institutions designed to 
prevent them, and discusses why they failed to do so. 
This paper does not answer the question of why corruption is 
so hard to eradicate.  Its more modest ambition is to show that laws 
and institutions, standing alone, are not enough. 
 
 AUTHOR: George Langendorf is an International attorney with nine 
years experience in the United States and South Africa. He has broad 
expertise in corporate and commercial law, business development, 
project finance, and litigation; specialized knowledge in oil, gas and 
renewable energy. He has an advanced degree in anticorruption law. 
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THE MAP IS NOT THE TERRITORY:  HOW SOUTH 
AFRICA FOLLOWED THE 
ANTI-CORRUPTION ROADMAP AND GOT LOST 




I. THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
The modern anti-corruption movement can be traced back to 
the passage by the United States of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act (hereinafter, FCPA) in 1977.1  Designed as a response to the Wa-
tergate scandal and other corrupt activities revealed in U.S. Con-
gressional hearings in the 1970s, the FCPA outlined the basic param-
eters of the offense of corruption, and served as the starting point 
from which future laws and treaties would depart.2  The FCPA was 
aggressively enforced not only domestically, but in foreign coun-
tries as well, against companies that sometimes had only a tenuous 
connection to the United States.  In this way, the FCPA also 
brought into consideration the idea of global markets and competition 
that would be infused into many of the multilateral treaties and con-
ventions. 
Due to its strong, and continuing, influence, this section briefly 
tells the story of the FCPA, including its history, its elements and de-
fenses, and its impact on corporate governance. 
A.  A Brief History 
In the 1970s, two events occurred roughly contemporaneously in 
the United States, which highlighted the prevalence and costs of 
corruption.  First, and more well-known, the Watergate scandal led 
to the impeachment and subsequent resignation of President Richard 
Nixon.  Second, and less celebrated, the U.S Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) revealed the results of an investigation 
detailing widespread bribery of foreign officials by U.S. companies.3  
 
 1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1-3, 78ff (1999). 
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In response to public outrage and cries for integrity stemming from 
these events, Congress passed the FCPA, broadly prohibiting the 
payment of anything of value to a foreign official for the purpose of 
influencing him or her to act improperly, and requiring companies 
to keep books and records that accurately reflect all payments.4 
In the 1980s, although there had been little enforcement of the 
FCPA, a perception arose in the business community that the 
FCPA put American companies at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other 
companies.  So, in 1988 Congress amended the FCPA to add two af-
firmative defenses, and directed the President to negotiate a treaty 
with U.S. allies that would level the playing field.5 
These negotiations took place within the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), and led to the pas-
sage in 1997 of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Officials in International Business Transactions (hereinafter, 
OECD Convention), which obliged state parties to adopt laws outlaw-
ing the bribery of foreign officials.6 
After the passage of the OECD convention, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) and the SEC (collectively, the “Enforce-
ment Agencies”) began to ramp up enforcement of the FCPA.7   In 
this regard, a key development was the introduction of settlements 
by the DOJ in 2004, whereby companies agree to pay fines and en-
gage in corrective actions, and the government agrees not to file 
criminal charges.  This enabled the Enforcement Agencies to resolve 
 
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FCPA: A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012) (describing 
the factors that led to the enactment of the FCPA) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/guide.pdf. 
 4. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd(1-3), 78ff. 
 5. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 5003, 102 
Stat. 1107 (1988). 
 6. The OECD Convention led to the adoption of anticorruption laws in all 34 OECD 
states, and several others, including Russia and South Africa, which constitute a large 
percentage of the world’s economy. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as 
of 21 May 2014, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
[OECD], http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD Convention Ratification Status] (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
 7. Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 430-31 (2012) 
(stating that “the FCPA was rarely enforced in the 1980s and 1990s” and that 
“from 2006 to 2010, the federal government brought more FCPA cases than it did 
from 1977 to 2005 combined”). 
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FCPA investigations without the risk and expense associated with 
proving their allegations at trial, and thus to cast their nets more 
broadly.8 
Since 2004, the Enforcement Agencies have collected billions 
of dollars in fines from some of the world’s largest companies, in-
cluding an $800 million fine against Siemens for widespread corrupt 
practices in numerous countries, and a $580 million penalty against 
Halliburton for paying bribes to secure contracts to build a liq-
uid-to-natural-gas facility in Nigeria.9    More recently, in 2013 the 
Enforcement Agencies concluded an enforcement action against To-
tal S.A. that requires it to pay a criminal fine of $245 million.10 
B.  A Closer Look:  Elements, Defenses and Jurisdiction 
At a high level, the FCPA prohibits the bribery of foreign offi-
cials and requires companies to take reasonable steps to accurately 
reflect all payments in their books and records.11  In FCPA parlance, 
these requirements are typically discussed separately, with the former 
known as “the anti- bribery provisions” and the latter the referred to 
as the “accounting provisions.”12 
To violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, a payment must 
be made “corruptly,”13 consist of money or “anything of value,”14 be 
 
 8. Id. at 431-36. 
 9. Plea Agreement at 5, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaf (Bankr. D. 
N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-
plea.pdf; see also Settlement Agreement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Siemens Aktieng-
esellschaf (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm; SEC Charges KBR and Hallibur-
ton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm; Dept. of Justice Office of Pub. 
Affairs, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and 
Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-
charges-and-agrees-pay-402-million . 
 10. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. Total, S.A., (E.D. Va. May 26, 
2013) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9392013529103746998524.pdf. 
 11. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)-(b). 
 12. See, e.g., Cort Malmberg and Alison B. Miller, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1077 (2013) (discussing the “accounting provisions” and the “anti-
bribery” provisions). 
 13. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(as to “issuers”). 
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made “in order to obtain or retain business,”15 and be made to a 
“foreign official.”16  The anti-bribery provisions are theoretically 
subject to certain exceptions or affirmative defenses.  Thus, even if 
the above elements are met, a payment does not violate the FCPA if 
it is a “facilitating payment,”17 a “reasonable or bona fide expendi-
ture,”18 or a lawful payment in terms of the laws of the foreign coun-
try.19  However, in contrast to the broad interpretations of the ele-
ments, each of these limitations or defenses has been interpreted 
narrowly.20 
The accounting provisions are violated if a company fails to 
keep accurate books and records, knowingly falsifies those books and 
records, or fails to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal 
accounting controls.21  In many cases, if it cannot be shown that ex-
ecutives at a parent company were involved in corruption at a subsid-
iary, the SEC has taken the view that the company failed to adopt 
sufficient protocols to prevent corruption.  This had led to charges 
that the accounting provisions are subject to strict liability.22 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.at § 78dd-1(a)(1). 
 16. Id.; see also Alexander L. Harisiadis, Comment, Foreign Official, Define Thyself: How 
to Define Foreign Officials and Instrumentalities in the Face of Aggressive Enforce-
ment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 507 (2013). 
 17. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b); for a discussion of the “facilitation payment” exception, 
see generally, Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When is a Bribe not a Bribe?  A Re-
examination of the FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 
111 (2013); Jon Jordan, The OECD’s Call for an End to ‘Corrosive’ Facilitation Pay-
ments and the International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881 (2011). 
 18. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2). 
 19. Id. at § 78dd-1(c)(1) (as to “issuers”). 
 20. See Deiter Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures 
Defense, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 37, 46 (2013) (stating that “although the FCPA 
bribery liability provision has received broad interpretation, the exceptisona nd de-
fences to liability are narrow”); Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Il-
lusory Affirmative Defenses Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 464, 466 (2010) (stating that the FCPA’s affirmative offenses are con-
strued so narrowly as to be “illusory”). 
 21. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). 
 22. Irina Sivachenko, Note, Corporate Victims of ‘Victimless Crime’: How the FCPA’s 
Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages 
Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REV. 393, 414 (arguing that holding a company liable for un-
authorised violations of its agents constitutes “strict vicarious liability”). 
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The FCPA imposes jurisdiction over three types of entities: 
“domestic concerns,” defined as 
“any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of 
the U.S.” or any entity with a principal place of business in 
the U.S. or that is organized under U.S. law;23 “issuers,” 
meaning any company that has a class of securities regis-
tered with the SEC or that is otherwise required to file re-
ports with the SEC, and that use “the [U.S.] mails or any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” in further-
ance of the scheme;24  and “other persons,” meaning any 
entity or person that is neither an “issuer” nor a “domestic 
concern” if that person uses the mails or engages in inter-
state commerce in furtherance of any improper payment 
scheme “while in the territory of the United States.”25 
On its face, therefore, the FCPA is a relatively straightfor-
ward prohibition of bribery of foreign public officials, which ap-
plies to U.S. entities and foreign entities making use of the U.S. mails 
or engaging in interstate commerce.  In practice, however, the stat-
ute has been interpreted broadly and enforced aggressively. 
C.  Methods of Enforcement 
The influence of the FCPA has everything to do with the way it 
has been interpreted and enforced by the Enforcement Agencies.  In 
particular, the Enforcement Agencies have asserted broad extraterri-
torial jurisdiction; adopted broad interpretations of the meaning of 
key terms of the statute; employed aggressive theories based on 
agency, attempt, and conspiracy to encompass companies falling out-
side jurisdiction; and, perhaps most importantly, pursued settlements 
rather than convictions, an approach that enables these aggressive in-
terpretations of the statute to avoid judicial scrutiny. 
 
 23. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a),(h). 
 24. Id. at § 78dd-1(a).  Many companies trade securities or issue depository receipts on 
U.S. stock exchanges.  This provision brings them within the reach of the FCPA, 
whether or not they have a physical presence in the United States. 
 25. Id. at § 78dd-3(a).  This is broader than the territorial jurisdiction that applies to issu-
ers, because it covers not just the use of the U.S. mails or interstate commerce but also 
“any other act” in furtherance of the corrupt payment.  Id. 
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1.   Jurisdiction 
In considering the reasons for the dramatic impact of the FCPA 
on companies worldwide, it is important to note that the Enforcement 
Agencies have interpreted the territorial jurisdiction applicable to “is-
suers” and “other persons” quite broadly, so that it is triggered by 
seemingly innocuous actions such as placing a call or sending an 
email or fax from, to or through the United States, sending a wire 
transfer from or to a U.S. bank, or otherwise using the U.S. banking 
system. 
For example, JCG, a Japanese company, was part of a four-
company joint venture that submitted a bid to design and build a liq-
uefied natural gas plant on Bonny Island, Nigeria.26  In order to se-
cure the contracts, the joint venture hired agents to pay bribes to ex-
ecutives at the Nigerian national oil company.27  The matter therefore 
involved a Japanese company doing business in Nigeria, and the only 
connection to the United States was that certain payments flowed 
through U.S. bank accounts, and several co-conspirators faxed or 
emailed information to colleagues in the United States.  Nonethe-
less, the DOJ considered this a sufficient nexus with the United 
States for jurisdiction to attach, JCG eventually agreed to a settle-
ment, including a payment of $218 million.28 
Similarly, in 2006, Tenaris, a Luxembourg-based supplier of 
tubes and related services for the energy industry, paid an “agent” 
to provide it with confidential bidding information related to ten-
ders issued by the Uzbeki state-owned oil company.  Despite the 
fact that Tenaris was a Luxembourgian company doing business in 
Uzbekistan, the Enforcement Agencies asserted jurisdiction on the 
grounds that Tenaris traded depository receipts on the New York 
Stock Exchange, making it an “issuer,” and certain payments were 
paid via a New York bank.29 
 
 26. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment A para. 2, U.S. v. JCG Corporation 
(S.D. TX. Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/04-6-11jgc-corp-dpa.pdf. 
 27. Id. at para. 15. 
 28. Id. at para 6. 
 29. Deferred Prosecution Agreemetn at 1, 6(a), (m), Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tenaris 
S.A., (May 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-
dpa.pdf. 
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2.   Interpretation 
As stated above, a payment does not violate the FCPA unless it 
is made to a “foreign official.”  The FCPA defines a “foreign offi-
cial” as “any officer or employee of a foreign government,” as well 
as “any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof . . .”30 
The Enforcement Agencies have taken the position that state-
owned entities (i.e. a national oil company, electric utility, or rail-
road) are “instrumentalities” of governments, and t h e i r  employees 
are therefore “foreign officials” under the FCPA, and have aggres-
sively prosecuted companies on this basis.31  Indeed, in the majority 
of FCPA enforcement actions, the alleged recipient of the bribe is 
an officer or employee of a state-owned company, rather than a 
member of government.32 
The Enforcement Agencies have pushed the definition of “for-
eign official” further still.  They have taken the view that any em-
ployee within a state- run sector, such as a physician in a country 
where health care is nationalized, is a “foreign official” for FCPA 
purposes.  The Enforcement Agencies recently collected $60 mil-
lion from Pfizer,33 $29.4 million from Eli Lilly,34  and $70 million 
 
 30. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 31. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 907 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 966 
(2010) (“No enforcement agency interpretation contributes more to the façade of 
FCPA enforcement than the FCPA’s ‘foreign official’ element”). 
 32. The question of whether an employee of state-owned entity is a “foreign official” has 
recently been contested and has been found to be a question of fact.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Aguilar, et al., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that 
the Comisión Federal de Electricidad, an electric utility that is wholly owned by the 
Mexican government, could be an agency or instrumentality of the Mexican govern-
ment); United States v. Carson et al, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (concluding that “ultimately the question of whether 
state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of 
fact.”).  The Carson court set forth a list of relevant factors that includes the foreign 
state’s degree of control over the state-owned entity; the purpose of the SOE’s activi-
ties; the SOE’s obligations, privileges and powers to administer its functions; and the 
extent of ownership or financial support provided by the state.  Id. at *4. 
 33. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corporation (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 
2012), available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-08-
07-pfizer-dpa.pdf (last visited 16 January 2012); U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC 
Files Settled FCPA Charges Against Pfizer Inc. and Wyeth LLC (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22438.htm. 
 34. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Eli Lilly and Company with FCPA Viola-
tions (Dec. 20, 2012), 
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from Johnson & Johnson,35  all on the theory that bribery of doc-
tors in countries with nationalized healthcare constitutes bribery of a 
“foreign official” under the FCPA. 
3.   Legal Theories 
In addition to broad interpretations of the elements and jurisdic-
tional reach of the FCPA, the Enforcement Agencies have also em-
ployed concepts such as successor liability, subsidiary liability, and 
conspiracy to reach entities and schemes that would otherwise fall 
outside the ambit of the FCPA. 
Successor liability involves holding acquirers liable for failure to 
uncover, or uncovering and not disclosing, corruption in an acquired 
company, even if the conduct took place years before the acquisition.  
This plays a role in a large percentage of FCPA enforcement actions.  
In 2011, for example, the SEC fined Diageo for improper payments 
that were made by employees of its subsidiaries in India, South Ko-
rea and Thailand to increase the placement and promotion of Diageo 
products, even though the payments were made before Diageo ac-
quired those subsidiaries.36  The DOJ’s action against Johnson & 
Johnson in the same year was based on corrupt practices at 
DePuy, a company it had recently acquired, which made corrupt 
payments to doctors at publicly owned hospitals in Greece, and the 
insufficiency of steps taken by Johnson & Johnson to halt these prac-
tices both pre- and post-acquisition.37 
Subsidiary liability refers to the Enforcement Agencies’ pen-
chant for holding parent companies liable for improper conduct that 
occurs at the subsidiary level.  In 2012, for example, over 50% of 
 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171487116; U.S. 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Eli Lilly and Company, No. 1:12-cv-02045 (D.D.C. filed 
Dec. 20, 2012), available at: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2012/comp-
pr2012-273.pdf. 
 35. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 1:11-cv-00686 (D.D.C. Apr. 
8, 2011) available at:; U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Johnson & Johnson 
with Foreign Bribery (Apr. 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
87.htm; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Johnson & Johnson 
(D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2011),  available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-dpa.pdf. 
 36. In the Matter of Diageo plc, Admin. Proceeding No. 3-14490, at 2-3, 9-10 (2011), 
available at: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-64978.pdf (last visited 22 
October 2013). 
 37. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Johnson & Johnson. supra note 33, at para 8, 16. 
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FCPA enforcement actions involved conduct that occurred in a local 
subsidiary of a multinational company.  For example, in the en-
forcement action against Orthofix NV – a medical device company 
headquartered in the Netherlands – the SEC alleged that employees at 
Orthofix’s wholly- owned subsidiary in Mexico, Promeca, had 
bribed officials at the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 
(IMSS), the state-owned provider of social services and health care.  
Neither the SEC or DOJ alleged any wrongful conduct or specific 
knowledge on the part of the parent company, but nonetheless Or-
thofix settled and agreed, among other things, to pay a fine of $5.4 
million.38  
The Enforcement Agencies also regularly employ the United 
States’ general conspiracy and aiding and abetting statutes39 to 
charge violations of the FCPA.40   That is to say, even if any entity 
is not a “domestic concern,” “issuer,” or “other person” committing 
improper conduct with a nexus to the United States, the Enforcement 
Agencies may still allege that its parent company conspired to vio-
late the FCPA, or aided and abetted in the FCPA violation, if they 
are subject to FCPA jurisdiction.41 
 
 38. This creates another challenge from a corporate governance perspective, because it 
requires a level of supervision over distant transaction that is difficult to achieve. 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
 40. Aiding and abetting is not an independent crime, thus the government must prove that 
an underlying violation was committed. The Enforcement Agency Guidelines state 
that, in enacting the FCPA in 1977, Congress explicitly noted that “the concepts of aid-
ing and abetting and joint participation would apply to a violation under this bill in the 
same manner in which those concepts have always applied in both SEC civil actions 
and in implied private actions brought under the securities laws generally.”  Unlawful 
Corporate Payments Act of 1977, H.R. 3815, 95th Cong. § 6 (1st Sess. 1977). 
 41. In the enforcement action against Smith & Nephew PLC, a medical device maker 
based in the UK, for example, the Enforcement Agencies alleged that employees at the 
US subsidiary were bribing Greek health care providers to use their products.  The 
subsidiary was charged with violating the FCPA, and the parent company, even with-
out any allegation of specific knowledge, was charged with conspiracy to violate the 
FCPA.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Smith & Nephew 
PLC (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/smith-nephew/2012-02-01-s-n-
dpa.pdf. 
See also U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty 
(Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-
resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-546 (where aiding 
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4.   Settlements 
It should be clear from the foregoing that the SEC and DOJ en-
force the FCPA aggressively; even more importantly is the fact that 
the FCPA is enforced almost entirely via settlement.  Indeed, it is fair 
to say that today in the United States, deferred prosecution agree-
ments (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) have al-
most entirely supplanted prosecution as a method of resolving FCPA 
investigations.  For example, in 2012 the DOJ did not convict a sin-
gle company of an FCPA violation, but nonetheless collected $126.5 
million in criminal fines from companies including Pfizer, Marubeni, 
Data Systems, Smith & Nephew, and BizJet, all under the auspi-
ces of DPAs.  Similarly, every FCPA enforcement action in 2013 has 
been resolved either by DPA or NPA, including a recent DPA under 
which Total S.A. agreed to pay a criminal fine of $245 million.42 
A DPA is in essence a settlement agreement whereby the gov-
ernment agrees to suspend criminal prosecution for a specified period 
of time, normally 1-3 years, and in exchange, the organization agrees 
to take certain steps, s u c h  a s  making admissions, paying a fine, 
implementing a compliance program, submitting annual reports, and 
terminating employees.  If the organization complies with the terms 
of the agreement, the government typically will permanently dismiss 
the case at the end of the term. 
To understand why the introduction of DPAs is so important, 
it is useful to consider the position of both  the  prosecutors and 
the  organizations where DPAs or other settlements are available.  
On one side sits the government: expected to prosecute, chronically 
under-resourced, and faced with an exacting standard of proof.  On 
the other side, often, is a multinational corporation: risk averse, con-
cerned about corporate criminal conviction, afraid of individual pros-
 
and abetting was used in the context of a joint venture to reach a defendant where ju-
risdiction might otherwise have been lacking). 
 42. U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., French Oil and Gas Company, Total, S.A., 
Charged in the United States and France in Connection with an International Bribery 
Scheme, (May 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/french-oil-and-gas-company-
total-sa-charged-united-states-and-france-connection-international.  Total also entered 
into a settlement with the SEC requiring it to disgorge an additional $153 million. U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Total S.A. for Illegal Payments to Iranian Offi-
cial (May 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171575006. 
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ecution at the leadership level, and in possession of virtually unlim-
ited resources to forestall, delay and appeal criminal convictions.  
Without a settlement mechanism, the two sides stare one another 
down, with the specter of a criminal trial functioning like a kind of 
mutually assured destruction. 
Introducing DPAs to the mix of available outcomes dramatically 
changes the picture.  From an organization’s standpoint, although a 
DPA has some disadvantages, such as the admission of wrongdoing 
and the payment of a substantial penalty, it allows the company to 
avoid the expense, uncertainty and negative publicity of a criminal 
trial, and eliminates the risk of collateral consequences, such as de-
barment, which may accompany formal conviction.43  From a prose-
cutor’s perspective, a DPA achieves much the same result as a 
conviction, such as disruption of the bribery scheme and disgorge-
ment of profits, but does not require the same outlay of resources, or 
carry the risk of loss, thereby allowing limited resources to be uti-
lized much more effectively.44  Crucially, these settlements also 
shield the Enforcement Agency’s interpretations of the law from ju-
dicial scrutiny,45 and remove the incentive defendants would other-
wise have to contest them. 
In short, the availability of DPAs creates an incentive for both 
sides to settle rather than incur the risks and costs associated 
with a  criminal trial, and shields Enforcement Agency interpreta-
tions from judicial scrutiny.  This in turn facilitates a dramatic in-
crease in enforcement activity. 
 
 43. Ross MacDonald, Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforce-
ment Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 427, 431-33 (2012) (noting that by settling in-
stead of prosecuting, the SEC is able to extract cooperation from the defendant, max-
imize its resources and avoid litigation risk). 
 44. See Lanny A. Breuer, Address to the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), 
available at: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-
1209131.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 45. John Ashcroft and John Ratliff, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding 
FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 34 (2012) (“Because protesting 
such questionable interpretations in a court of law would first require a company to be 
criminally indicted .  the company is left between the proverbial rock and a hard place 
with no real choice but to accept whatever fines, penalties, or other requirements pros-
ecutors choose to impose upon it”). 
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D.  Impact on Corporate Governance 
As we have seen, the wording of the FCPA is susceptible to 
more modest interpretations. For example, the Enforcement Agen-
cies could have interpreted the jurisdictional requirement to call for 
a substantial nexus to the United States, rather than mere usage of 
U.S. emails or a correspondent U.S. bank.  They could have inter-
preted “public official” to exclude employees of state-owned compa-
nies, which would have eliminated more than half of enforcement ac-
tions.  Perhaps most importantly, they could have actually prosecuted 
companies they believed were guilty, and declined to charge where 
they lacked evidence, rather than employing DPAs or NPAs, an ap-
proach that in many cases imposes the burden on shareholders, rather 
than the perpetrators or even company management.46 
Instead, however, the Enforcement Agencies have applied the 
FCPA aggressively, resulting in a statute that, in practice, reaches 
almost any corrupt payment made by a person, company, or their 
agent or subsidiary, with any connection to the United States, no mat-
ter how slight, or by anyone who conspires with or aids  and  abets  in  
the  making  of  such  a  payment,  if  that  payment  is  made  to  any 
government official, or any employee of any state-owned company, 
or anyone who works in a nationalized sector.  Given the Hobson’s 
choice of either acquiescing to the Enforcement Agencies’ interpreta-
tions via settlement, or facing a criminal trial, risk-averse companies 
unanimously choose the former. 
The aggressive enforcement of the FCPA has had a dramatic ef-
fect on corporate governance.   In particular, the threat of penalties 
and criminal liability has motivated companies to establish anti-
corruption policies and procedures, which are now key components 
of a  modern-day corporate governance requiem. 
A contemporary anti-corruption compliance policy might require 
that: 
(1) payments  to  offshore  entities  be  restricted  or  sub-
ject  to  special  approvals, particularly where a foreign 
government or SOE is insisting upon the payment; 
 
 46. See MacDonald, supra note 41, at 421-22. 
2015  UB Journal of International Law 
 46 
(2) contract prices and even profit margins be subject to au-
diting and review to ensure prices are not inflated to provide 
funding for slush funds or kickbacks; 
(3) agents and distributors be investigated and subjected 
to background and credit checks in an attempt to root out 
conflicts of interest and self-dealing; 
(4) interactions  with  government  officials  or  employees  
of  state-owned  entities  be formalized, and meetings rec-
orded; 
(5) company contracts be modified to require both sides not 
to engage in any conduct that constitutes corruption; 
(6) the books and records of suppliers and distributors be 
reviewed to ensure all payments are properly recorded; 
(7) detailed policies be created specifying what gifts, if 
any, may be given to clients, and what amount of enter-
tainment may be paid for; 
(8) contracts at the subsidiary level be routinely reviewed, 
with any common corruption red flags, such as payments to 
offshore accounts or “consultants,” receiving additional 
scrutiny; and 
(9) financial statements at both the subsidiary and corporate 
level be routinely audited to ensure payments are properly 
reflected. 
These are merely some of the many policies and procedures 
that companies put in place in order to forestall corruption.  Many 
multilateral entities and non-governmental organizations now pub-
lish guidelines and best practices regarding such procedures.47 
All this compliance comes at a high cost, to say nothing of the 
cost of conducting an FCPA compliance overhaul at the behest of the 
 
 47. See, e.g., OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compli-
ance (Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/44884389.pdf; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS 
PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY (2nd ed. 2009), available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles; 
UK MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE ABOUT PROCEDURES 
WHICH RELEVANT COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS CAN PUT INTO PLACE TO PREVENT 
PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM FROM BRIBING (Mar. 30, 2011), available at 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf. 
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Enforcement Agencies.48  There are some who suggest that compli-
ance costs exceed the level of deterrence actually achieved.  Indeed, 
the requirements above have spawned an entirely new industry, 
sometimes derisively referred to as “FCPA Inc.,” consisting of law-
yers, auditors, forensic investigators, and compliance executives 
whose jobs are devoted to policing compliance with the new anti-
corruption regimes. 
However, it is also generally conceded that the threat of en-
forcement actions, and indeed of criminal liability, has contributed to 
a dramatic rise in the level of awareness regarding corruption. More-
over, as discussed in the next section, the FCPA and the OECD Con-
vention served as the foundation of the treaties and conventions that 
would create the “roadmap” for fighting corruption around the 
globe. 
II. THE MAP: TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS FOR 
COMBATING CORRUPTION 
While the FCPA has been the dominant anti-corruption statute 
over the past several decades, it is far from the only development in 
anti-corruption law.  To the contrary, in parallel with the rise of the 
FCPA, the past twenty years have seen a barrage of legislation, trea-
ties, conventions, guidelines and other instruments designed to 
eliminate corruption.   These include inter alia the 1996 OAS Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption; the 1997 OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Internation-
al Business Transactions; the 1999 Council of Europe Criminal Law 
and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption; the 2003 United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC); a n d  the 2 0 0 3  Afri-
can Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(AU Convention) (collectively, “the Instruments”).49 
 
 48. See Samuel Rubenfield, Avon Begins FCPA Settlement Talks, WALL ST. J. (Aug 1, 
2012, 11:21AM) (reporting that Avon spent $280 million investigating allegations of 
bribery in China and around the world) http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/08/01/avon-begins-fcpa-settlement-talks/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 49. OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, B-58; Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD, Nov. 21, 1997 [hereinafter OECD Convention]; Council of Eu-
rope Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 1, 1999, E.T.S. 173; Civil Law 
Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. 174; United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 [hereinafter UNCAC]; African Union Conven-
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As of 2014, these Instruments cover most of the countries in 
world, with many nations being party to  multiple  instruments.  For 
example, UNCAC boasts 140 signatories and 170 state parties;50  all 
34 of the members of the OECD are state parties to the OECD 
Convention, along with six other countries that are not OECD mem-
bers: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Columbia, Russia and South Afri-
ca;51  and the AU Convention has been signed by 48 African coun-
tries, and ratified by 34 of those countries.52 
The Instruments represent a global consensus on the ills associ-
ated with corruption and the necessary mechanisms for combating the 
problem.  Taken together, t h e y  represent a  “roadmap” for fighting 
corruption. 
A.  Anti-corruption Laws 
A primary purpose of each of the Instruments, and a key aspect 
of the roadmap, is the definition and criminalization of the offense of 
“corruption.”  Although the definitions of “corruption” vary slightly, 
they are all fundamentally similar to the o f f e n s e  o f  bribery 
under the FCPA: the offering, giving or receiving of anything of val-
ue in order to improperly influence the actions of another party, usu-
ally a public official.53 
 
tion on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted Jul. 11, 2003, 2860 U.N.T.S. 
50008 (entered into force Aug. 5, 2006) [hereinafter AU Convention],. In addition to 
the treatises and conventions referenced above, there is considerable “soft law” on cor-
ruption.  See WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK GROUP INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES 
(Feb. 1, 2011), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/IntegrityComplianceGuideline
s_2_1_11web.pdf; TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 45.  There are also sec-
tor-specific initiatives.  See What is the EITI? EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE, available at https://eiti.org/eiti. 
 50. United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as 
of 1 April 2015, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME [UNODC] (Apr. 1, 
2015) [hereinafter Signatories to the UNCAC], 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.  
 51. OECD Convention Ratification Status, supra note 6. 
 52. List of Countries Which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU Convention on the 
Combating and Prevention of Terrorism, AFRICAN UNION (Feb. 21, 2013), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Convention%20on%20Terrorism.pdf (last visit-
ed Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter AU Convention Signatories]. 
 53. FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(a); UNCAC 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 15(a), (b) (requiring 
signatories to adopt legislation criminalizing “the promise, offering or giving, to a pub-
lic official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage .  in order that the official act 
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However, the Instruments broaden the scope of “corruption” 
significantly in comparison.   For example, while the FCPA o n -
l y  prohibits “active” bribery – the offering or payment of bribes – 
the Instruments also criminalize passive bribery – the solicitation or 
receipt of bribes.54    Similarly, while the FCPA applies only to brib-
ery of public officials, the Instruments, with the exception of the 
OECD Convention, apply to bribery in both the public and the pri-
vate sector.55   The Instruments also require state parties to criminal-
ize the possession, concealment, and laundering of the proceeds of 
corruption,56  and create the offense of “illicit enrichment,” which 
puts the burden on a government official to show that his or her 
wealth was acquired legitimately.57 
The Instruments call for state parties to pass ancillary legislation 
and make modifications t o  c r i m i n a l  procedure to assist with 
t h e  prosecution of corruption as well, such as the protection of 
witnesses from retaliation or intimidation,58 and whistle-blowers 
 
or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties”  as well as the solici-
tation or acceptance by a public official of the same); AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 
50008, art. 4(1)(a), (b) (prohibiting the “solicitation or acceptance .  by a public official 
or any other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit .  in exchange 
for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions” as well as the 
offering or granting of same to a public official); OECD Convention art. 1(1). 
 54. Id.; South African Development Community Protocol Against Corruption art. 1(a), 
adopted Aug. 14, 2001 (entered into force July 6, 2005) [hereinafter SADC Protocol]. 
 55. E.g., AU Convention, supra note 47, at art 4(1)(a), (b), (e); UNCAC, supra note 47, 
art. 7,12, 21; SADC Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 1(e). 
 56. See, e.g., SADC Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 3(g); AU Convention, supra note 47, at 
art. 4(1)(h); UNCAC, supra note 47, at art. 14(1), 23(1), 52 (addressing “measures to 
prevent money-laundering,” prohibiting the “laundering of proceeds of crime,” and 
“governing the prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime”). 
 57. See, e.g., AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 4(1)(g); UNCAC, 2349 
U.N.T.S. 41, art. 20 (providing that state parties must consider establishing illicit en-
richment as a criminal offence, and defining it as “a significant increase in the assets of 
a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful 
income”). 
 58. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 32(1) (requiring each state party to “provide 
effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses and experts 
who give testimony”); AU Convention, supra note 47, at art. 5(5) (requiring state par-
ties to undertake to “adopt legislative and other measures to protect informants and 
witnesses in corruption and related offences, including protection of their identities”). 
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from reprisals.59    State parties must also recognize inchoate crimes 
such as attempt, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting corruption.60 
Additionally, the Instruments provide state parties with expan-
sive jurisdiction over corruption.  For example, aside from jurisdic-
tion over corruption committed in its territory, UNCAC also allows 
jurisdiction where the offense is committed by or against a state party 
national, or a “stateless person who has his or her habitual residence 
in [state party] territory.”61  The AU Convention goes further still, 
and permits jurisdiction “when the offence, although committed out-
side its jurisdiction, affects, in the view of the state concerned, its vi-
tal interests or the deleterious or harmful consequence or effects of 
such offences impact on the state party.”62   Each of the instruments 
also specifies that jurisdiction lies as against legal persons as well as 
natural persons.63 
B.  Institutions 
As a second component of the roadmap, the Instruments require 
state parties to establish institutions for investigating and prosecuting 
corruption.  For instance, the AU Convention directs state parties to 
“establish, maintain and strengthen independent national anti-
 
 59. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 33 (providing that each state party must con-
sider incorporating “measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment 
for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds .  any facts con-
cerning offences established in accordance with [UNCAC]”); AU Convention, 28600 
U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 5(6) (requiring state parties to “adopt measures that ensure citi-





 60. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 27(1) (requiring prohibition of “participation 
in any capacity such as an accomplice, assistant or instigator”); SADC Protocol art. 
3(1)(h) (defining “acts of corruption” to include “participation as a principal, co-
principal, agent, instigator, accomplice, or accessory after the fact .  or attempted 
commission of, in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit [corruption]”); AU Con-
vention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 4(1)(i) (outlawing attempted corruption as well as 
any participation including being an agent, accomplice, instigator, co-conspirator). 
 61. UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 42(2). 
 62. AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 13(1)(d). 
 63. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 26 (requiring state parties to establish the 
liability of legal persons for acts of corruption). 
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corruption authorities or agencies.”64  State parties may either create 
a single anti-corruption agency or divide the task among multiple 
entities; however, the institution(s) must be sufficiently independent 
to perform its function without fear of interference by the executive 
branch or legislature.65 
The Instruments also require that these institutions be given the 
necessary powers, including the authority to freeze and seize the 
fruits of corruption.  For example, the AU Convention provides that 
each state party shall adopt measures to enable its authorities to 
“search, identify, trace, administer and freeze or seize the instrumen-
talities and proceeds of corruption pending a final judgment,” and to 
enable “confiscation of proceeds or property, the value of which cor-
responds to that of such proceeds, derived, from offences established 
in accordance with this convention.”66 
C.  Public Administration 
A third component of the roadmap requires state parties to make 
affirmative commitments regarding government administration.  This 
includes agreeing to adopt a system of accounting, which tracks and 
accurately reflects the expenditure of public funds.  The AU Con-
vention, for instance, requires state parties to adopt legislation to 
“create, maintain and strengthen internal accounting, auditing and 
follow-up systems, in particular, in the public income, custom and 
tax receipts . . . and management of public goods and services.”67 
 
 64. See, e.g., AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 5(3); SADC Protocol art. 
4(1)(g) (requiring parties to create and maintain “institutions responsible for imple-
menting mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and eradicating corruption”); 
UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 6(2) (requiring state parties to grant enforcement insti-
tutions “the necessary independence .  to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or 
their functions effectively and free from any undue influence”). 
 65. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 6(1), (2) (requiring parties to ensure the ex-
istence of a body or bodies to investigate and prosecute corruption). 
 66. See, e.g., AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 16(1), (2); SADC Protocol art 
8(1) (requiring state parties to adopt measures to enable “confiscation of proceeds de-
rived from offences established in accordance with this Protocol, or property the value 
of which corresponds to that of such proceeds; and its competent authorities to identi-
fy, trace and freeze or seize proceeds, property or instrumentalities for the purpose of 
eventual confiscation”). 
 67. See, e.g., AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 5(4); UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 
41, art. 9(2) (requiring that each party shall “promote transparency and accountability 
in the management of public finances” such as adopting a national budget, reporting on 
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This component also encompasses open and transparent pro-
curement of goods and services. T h e  UNCAC in particular em-
phasizes the importance of procurement, obligating state parties to 
“establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparen-
cy, competition and objective criteria in decision-making,”68 and that 
such systems must address distribution of information relating to 
tenders, conditions for participation, criteria for evaluating bids, 
and an effective system of review and appeal.69 
Finally, the Instruments require state parties to hold gov-
ernment officials to a code of conduct or other similar standards.  
The UNCAC states that state parties shall “endeavor to apply . . . 
codes or standards of conduct for the correct, honorable and proper 
performance of public functions,” and provides for other aspects such 
as disclosure of conflicts of interest and disciplinary measures for vi-
olators.70   These codes are not set forth in the Instruments them-
 
revenue and expenditure, and adopting a “system of accounting and auditing standards 
and related oversight”). 
 68. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 9(1); SADC Protocol art. 4(1)(b) (stating 
that state parties will “create, maintain and strengthen systems of hiring and procure-
ment of goods and services that ensure the transparency, equity and efficiency of such 
systems”). 
 69. UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 9(1)(a)-(e).  The importance of procurement is also 
addressed in an entirely separate set of instruments. See, e.g., OECD, Principles for In-
tegrity in Public Procurement (2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/48994520.pdf; United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on Public Procurement (2014); World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Agreement on Government Procurement (1994), available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf. Most jurisdictions also pro-
vide for debarment of bidders convicted of fraudulent offences.  See, e.g., Council Di-
rective 2004/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on 
the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Sup-
ply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, art. 45, 2004 O.J. (L 134), available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32004L0018&from=EN; World Bank, Guide-
lines, Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services, Under IBRD 
Loans and IDA Credits and Grants, by World Bank Borrowers, art. 1.16 (2011), avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/278019-
1308067833011/Procurement_GLs_English_Final_Jan2011.pdf; UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Public Procurement, art 21 (2014). 
 70. UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 8; see also, e.g., SADC Protocol art. 4(1)(a) (provid-
ing that each party will create, maintain and strengthen “standards of conduct for the 
correct, honourable and proper fulfillment of public functions as well as mechanisms to 
enforce those standards”); AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 7(2) (providing 
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selves, but have the effect of imposing fiduciary duties on public 
servants vis-à-vis the state and state funds. 
D.  International Cooperation 
The fourth key aspect of the anti-corruption roadmap is interna-
tional cooperation.  This reflects the fact that many crimes related 
to corruption are international in nature; involve multinational cor-
porations, and offshore entities and accounts; and thus require coop-
eration between states.71  Accordingly, the Instruments provide that 
state parties will extradite persons suspected of committing corrup-
tion.   
The key provisions regarding extradition are: 1) corruption is 
deemed an extraditable offense under any existing treaties between 
state parties;72 2) corruption must be included as an extraditable of-
fence in any extradition treaty concluded between state parties in the 
future;73 3) if a party receives a request from another state party with 
which it does not have an extradition treaty, the Instrument may serve 
as the legal basis for extradition;74 and 4) if a state party refuses to 
extradite a person accused of corruption on the basis that the person 
is a national, it must prosecute the alleged offender itself and inform 
the requesting state party of the outcome.75 
State parties also agree to provide each other with legal assis-
tance in the investigation and prosecution of corruption.  This con-
sists of a general undertaking to provide the broadest possible meas-
ure of mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of 
 
for the creation of a committee to “establish a code of conduct and to monitor its im-
plementation, and sensitize and train public officials on matters of ethics”). 
 
71. See L. Song Richardson, Convicting the Innocent in International Transnational Cases, 
a Comparative International Institutional Approach to the Problem, 26 BERK. J. INT’L. 
LAW 62, 80-81 (2008) (discussing the difficultly of prosecuting international crime and 
the purpose of mutual legal assistance treaties). 
 72. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 44(4); AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 
50008, art. 15(2); SADC Protocol art. 9(2). 
 73. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 44(4); AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 
50008, art. 15(2); SADC Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 9(3). 
 74. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 44(5); SADC Protocol art. 9(4). 
 75. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 44(11); AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 
50008, art. 15(6); SADC Protocol, supra note 52, at art. 9(7). 
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corruption,76 as well as commitments to assist with specific tasks, 
such as service of legal documents, execution of searches and sei-
zures, examinations of objects and sites, identification or tracing of 
the proceeds and instrumentalities of crimes, and provision of 
bank, property and governmental records.77   State parties also 
agree not to invoke bank secrecy as a mechanism to resist providing 
information, including financial information.78 
In fact, mutual legal assistance is such an important part of the 
roadmap that, for any state parties to the UNCAC that do not have a 
such an agreement amongst themselves, the UNCAC functions as a 
legal basis for such assistance, and provides rules regarding inter alia 
when assistance should be rendered, t h e  transfer of persons, and 
the procedures for sending and responding to requests.79  The 
UNCAC also provides for cooperation with regard to asset confisca-
tion, requiring state parties to “take such measures as may be neces-
sary to permit its competent authorities to give effect to an order of 
 
 76. See, e.g., UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 46(1); SADC Protocol art. 10(1) (provid-
ing that “state parties shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual assis-
tance by processing requests from authorities that have the power to investigate or 
prosecute the acts of corruption described in the Protocol); AU Convention, 28600 
U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 18(1) (requiring the parties to provide each other with  “the 
greatest possible technical cooperation and assistance in dealing immediately with re-
quests form authorities that are empowered by virtue of their national laws to prevent, 
detect, investigate and punish acts of corruption and related offences”). 
 
 77. See, e.g.,UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 46(3); SADC Protocol art. 10(1)-(2) (pro-
vide that state parties will assist one another to “obtain evidence and take other nec-
essary action to facilitate legal proceedings and measures regarding the investigation 
or prosecution of acts of corruption” as well as “the broadest possible measure of as-
sistance in the identification, tracing, freeing, seizure and confiscation of property, in-
strumentalities or proceeds obtained, derived from or used in the commission of of-
fences established in accordance with this protocol”). 
 78. See, e.g., SADC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 8(2), (3) (providing that each state party shall 
“empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or 
commercial records be made available or be seized and shall not invoke bank secrecy 
as a basis for refusal to provide assistance” [to a requesting state party]); AU Conven-
tion, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 17(1), (3) (requiring that each state party shall adopt 
such measures as are necessary to “empower its courts or other competent authorities 
to order the confiscation or seizure of banking, financial or commercial documents 
with a view to implementation of this convention” and that “state parties shall not in-
voke banking secrecy to justify their refusal to cooperate with regard to acts of corrup-
tion and related offences by virtue of this Convention”). 
 79. UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art. 46(9)-(29). 
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confiscation issued by a court of another state party,”80 and to “take 
such measures as would permit its competent authorities to freeze or 
seize property upon a freezing or seizure order issued by a court or 
competent authority of a requesting state party that provides a rea-
sonable basis [for such action].”81 
 
E.  Access to Information 
The final aspect of the roadmap goes beyond the immediate 
conduct of the participants in corrupt activities, and touches on the 
rights of members of society vis-à-vis acts of corruption.  Among the 
most important of these is the right of access to information regarding 
corruption cases for citizens and the media. 
In support of this right, the AU Convention provides that 
“each state party shall adopt such legislative and other measures to 
give effect to the right of access to any information that is required to 
assist in the fight against corruption and related offen[s]es,”82 and 
that each state party undertakes to “ensure that the Media is given ac-
cess to information in cases of corruption and related offen[s]es.”83  
The South African Development Community Protocol (“SADC Pro-
tocol”) provides that state parties will “create, maintain and strength-
en . . . mechanisms to encourage participation by the media, civil so-
ciety and non-governmental organizations in efforts to prevent 
corruption.”84  In addition to affording access to information for citi-
 
 80. Id. at art. 54(2). 
 81. Id.  The AU Convention also provides that state parties should hand over to one an-
other any objects required by a requesting party as evidence of the offence of corrup-
tion or which has been acquired as a result of the offence for which extradition is re-
quested and which, at the time of arrest, is found in the possession of the persons. AU 
Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 16(2). 
 82. AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 9.  UNCAC requires that each state party 
will “take such measures as may be necessary to enhance transparency in its public 
administration” including “adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of 
the general public to obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, func-
tioning and decision-making processes of its public administration”.  UNCAC, 2349 
U.N.T.S. 41, art. 10(a). 
 83. AU Convention, 28600 U.N.T.S. 50008, art. 12(4). 
 84. SADC Protocol art 4(i); see also UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art 13(1)(b), (d) (requir-
ing state parties to by taking measures such as “ensuring that the public has effective 
access to information” and “respecting, promoting and protecting the freedom to seek, 
receive, publish and disseminate information concerning corruption”). 
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zens and the media, the Instruments also require state parties to take 
steps to encourage the involvement of civil society and non-
governmental organizations in the fight against corruption.85 
The roadmap goes well beyond the FCPA’s prohibition on brib-
ery of foreign officials.  By agreeing to the Instruments, state parties 
not only agree to criminalize bribery of foreign officials, but also to 
outlaw both active and passive corruption in both the public and pri-
vate sectors, create politically independent enforcement institutions, 
manage and account for public funds appropriately, require public 
servants to abide by codes of ethics, protect witnesses from intimida-
tion and whistle-blowers from reprisals, adopt transparent public 
procurement systems, allow access to information to citizens and 
the media, and cooperate with other nations in investigating and 
prosecuting corruption. 
In short, the roadmap represents a modern consensus that, where 
society operates on the principles of transparency, competition, 
fairness, and accountability, and where those principles are embod-
ied in the laws and institutions governing public sector business, cor-
ruption will not thrive.  Given that most of the countries in the world 
have become parties to the Instruments, one might expect that if 
countries are able to successfully implement the roadmap, they will 
be successful in the fight against corruption. 
The remainder of this paper analyzes whether this holds true, us-
ing South Africa as a lens through which to determine whether suc-
cess in implementation of the anti-corruption roadmap translates to 
success in the fight against corruption. 
III.   SOUTH AFRICA FOLLOWS THE MAP 
South Africa is the second largest economy in Africa, with 
GDP of $400 billion.  It emerged from apartheid and into independ-
ence in 1994 with the passage of a new and progressive constitu-
tion,86 followed by a spate of generally progressive legislation de-
 
 85. UNCAC, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, art 13(1) (requiring state parties to “promote the active 
participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, 
non-governmental organizations and community based organizations, in the prevention 
of and the fight against corruption”). 
 86. See Adrien Wing, The South African Constitution as a Role Model for the United 
States, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 73, 79 (2008) (calling for the United States to 
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signed to undo the apartheid legacy, and inculcate values such as 
freedom and transparency into the fabric of the nation.   A consti-
tutional democracy, South Africa is governed by the President, cur-
rently Jacob Zuma, and the Parliament.  There are multiple political 
parties; however, since 1994 the African National Congress, the polit-
ical party that successfully resisted and eventually ousted the apart-
heid regime, has dominated Parliament. 
South Africa has been an avid participant in the conventions and 
treaties opposing corruption.  It has signed and ratified a majority of 
the Instruments, including the UNCAC,87 the AU Convention,88 and 
the SADC Protocol.89  It has even acceded to the OECD Convention, 
thought it is not a member of the OECD.90  In short, South Africa 
has followed the anti-corruption roadmap to the letter. 
A.  Criminalization of Corruption in South Africa  
South Africa criminalized corruption with the passage of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act No. 12 of 2004 
(“PCCA”).  The PCCA creates the general offense of “corruption,” 
which consists of offering, giving or receiving gratification, or 
agreeing to offer, give or receive gratification, in order to act, or in-
fluence another to act, in a manner that is dishonest, an abuse of au-
thority or a violation of legal duties.91 
The PCCA also creates additional offenses, such as corrup-
tion in relation to specific persons (e.g., judges, elected officials),92 
corruption in connection with an employment relationship,93  and 
corruption in connection with a contract or tender.94  Additionally, 
 
“consider passing an amendment reinventing our equality clause along the lines of the 
South African equality clause”). 
 87. South Africa signed the UNCAC on December 9, 2003, and ratified it on November 
22, 2004. See Signatories to the UNCAC, supra note 48. 
 88. South Africa signed the AU Convention in March of 2004 and ratified it in November 
2005. See AU Convention Signatories, supra note 50. 
 89. SADC Protocol. 
 90. South Africa is not a member of the OECD, but nonetheless acceded to the OECD an-
ticorruption convention on 19 June 2007. It is the only African country to have done 
so.  See OECD Convention Ratification Status, supra note 49. 
 91. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 § 3. (S. Afr.) [herein-
after PCCA]. 
 92. Id. at §§ 4-9. 
 93. Id. at § 10. 
 94. Id. at § 12, 13. 
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persons in positions of authority who know of or suspect such of-
fenses are required to report them to the police.95   The scope of 
the PCCA is not limited to active bribery of foreign officials, but 
rather applies to “any person,” and includes passive bribery.  It also 
provides that attempt, inducement, aiding and abetting, and conspira-
cy to commit the corruption are punishable to the same extent as the 
underlying offense.96 
With respect to jurisdiction, the PCCA provides that, even if the 
alleged offense occurred outside South Africa, South African 
courts have jurisdiction “if the person to be charged is a citizen, is 
ordinarily a resident, or was arrested in South Africa.”  Furthermore, 
any act committed outside South Africa that is an offense under the 
PCCA is “deemed to have been committed also in the Republic” if it 
affects a public body, business, or person in the Republic, and the al-
leged perpetrator is in South Africa and is not extradited.97 
South Africa has also passed the requisite legislation to support 
and strengthen its anti-corruption efforts.  This includes the Protect-
ed Disclosures Act No. 26 of 2000, which protects whistle-blowers 
from “occupational detriment,” such as being fired, transferred, 
disciplined or denied promotion; the Witness Protection Act No. 
112 of 1998, which provides for the protection of witnesses 
who reasonably believe their safety is threatened; the Prevention of 
Organized Crime Act No. 121 of 1998, which provides for seizure 
of assets and the proceeds of criminal activity after, and in some cas-
es before, conviction of corruption-related offences; and the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001, which provides that bank 
secrecy is not a valid reason to refuse to share financial records 
related to a criminal investigation. 
B.  South Africa’s Anti-corruption Institutions 
As recommended by the roadmap, and required by the Instru-
ments, South Africa has also established independent institutions to 
 
 95. Id. at § 32. 
 96. Id. at § 20, 21.  South Africa has not separately criminalized an offense of “illicit en-
richment”, but the PCCA permits the NPA to seek permission to investigate based on a 
showing that a person maintains a standard of living that is above his or her income or 
assets.  See Id. at § 23. 
 97. Id. at §§ 35(1), (2). 
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enforce its anti-corruption laws.  Rather than a single overarching in-
stitution, the tasks are divided amongst a number of entities. 
Prosecution of corruption is handled exclusively by the Na-
tional Prosecution Authority (NPA), which, per section 179 of the 
Constitution and the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 
(NPA Act), is the only entity that can bring criminal proceedings.98  
The Constitution requires national legislation to ensure the NPA ex-
ercises its function “without fear, favor or prejudice,”99 and the NPA 
Act accordingly provides that the head of the NPA holds office for a 
ten-year term,100 can only be dismissed for misconduct, ill-health, in-
capacity or unfitness,101 and must be paid as much or more than a 
High Court Judge.102 
However, the independence of the NPA is not without limits.  
The Constitution also states that the head of the NPA is appointed 
by the President,103 that final responsibility for the NPA lies with 
“the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of jus-
tice,”104 and that the prosecution policy must be determined by the 
head of the NPA “with the concurrence of the Cabinet Member re-
sponsible for the administration of justice.”105   Although the head of 
the NPA can only be dismissed on certain grounds, the NPA Act al-
lows the President to provisionally suspend the head of the NPA 
without pay pending an inquiry into his or her alleged misconduct, ill 
health, incapacity or lack of fitness.106 
A specialized investigative unit principally carries out investiga-
tion of corruption in South Africa.  Until 2007, this unit, known at 
the time as the Directorate for Special Operations (“DSO”) or the 
“Scorpions,” was situated within the NPA and mandated to combat 
 
 98. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 179; National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) Act 32 of 1998 
sec. 2 (S. Afr.). 
 99. S. AFR. CONST., § 179(4). 
 100. NPA Act 32 of 1998 § 12(1). 
 101. Id. at § 12(8)(a)(i-ii). 
 102. Id. at § 17(1)(a). 
 103. S. AFR. CONST., § 179(1)(a); NPA Act 32 of 1998 § 10. 
 104. S. AFR. CONST., § 179(6). 
 105. S. AFR. CONST., § 179(5)(a). 
 106. NPA Act 32 of 1998 § 12(6)(a). 
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“top priority crime” including corruption.107  However, in 2007 the 
Scorpions were replaced by the Directorate of Priority Crime In-
vestigation (“DPCI”), or the “Hawks,” a unit situated within the 
South African Police Service (SAPS), which is also independently 
mandated to investigate crimes including “serious corruption.”108  As 
a consequence, investigation of corruption now falls primarily within 
the ambit of SAPS.109 
Two other institutions, the Public Protector and the Auditor 
General, are also prominently involved in the fight against corrup-
tion.110  The Public Protector, established per section 181(a) and 182 
of the Constitution, and the Public Protector Act No. 23 of 1994, op-
erates as a kind of ombudsman; the office is competent to investigate 
maladministration, abuse of power, unlawful enrichment in con-
nection with public administration, and the improper or dishonest 
acts or offences addressed by the PCCA.111  The Auditor General, 
established per section 181(e) and 188 of the Constitution, functions 
as the external auditor for government institutions and accountant for 
public funds.112  Both are constitutionally required to be “independ-
ent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law,” and to “exer-
cise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favor or 
prejudice.”113 
 
 107. The DSO was established by section 7(1)(a) of the NPA Act.  NPA Act 32 of 1998 § 
7(1)(a); PEDRO GOMES PEREIRA, ET AL., BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, SOUTH AFRICAN 
ANTI-CORRUPTION ARCHITECTURE 5, 37 (2012). 
 108. PEREIRA, supra note 105, at 5, 40.  SAPS is governed by the SAPS Act 68 of 1995, the 
SAPS Amendment Act of 2008 and the SAPS Amendment Act of 2012, which says 
that SAPS can investigate crimes, including corruption.  South Africa Police Service 
Act 68 of 1995 (S. Afr.); South Africa Police Service Act 68 of 2008 (S. Afr.); South 




109. The Hawks are overseen by a ministerial committee responsible for determining poli-
cy in terms of which they operate, identifying “priority offences,” and setting forth 
policy guidelines.  The President appoints the National Commissioner of SAPS. South 
Africa Police Service Act 68 of 1995; South Africa Police Service Amendment Act 57 
of 2008; South Africa Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012. 
 110. S. AFR. CONST., §181(1)(a), (e). 
 111. Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 § 6(4)(i)-(iv) (S. Afr.). 
 112. S. AFR. CONST., §188. 
 113. S. AFR. CONST., §181(2). 
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South Africa further has a bevy of commissions and other 
bodies that are also tasked with combating corruption in one manner 
or another. These include: 
(1) the  Special  Investigation Unit  (SIU), a  body that 
conducts  investigations  into corruption and has the pow-
er to search, seize, interrogate and issue subpoenas, but only 
when mandated to do so by Presidential Proclamation;114 
(2) the Asset Forfeiture  Unit  (AFU),  a  body  within  the  
NPA  that  is  charged  with enforcing the provisions of the 
Prevention of Organized Crime Act No. 121 of 1998, which 
permit the seizure of the proceeds of unlawful activity; 
(3) the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), an entity 
that includes representatives from both government and 
civil society and that evaluates progress and challenges in 
the fight against corruption;115 
(4) the Special Anti-Corruption Unit (SACU), a body estab-
lished to assist with the fight against corruption in the pub-
lic service;116 
(5) the  Anti-Corruption  Coordinating  Committee  
(ACCC),  a  body  created  by  the legislature and tasked 
with implementing the “Public Service Anti-Corruption 
Strategy” adopted by the Cabinet in 2002;117 
(6) the Anti-Corruption Inter-Ministerial Committee 
(ACIMC), an entity established in 2010 and tasked with 
ensuring coordination of the various efforts to combat cor-
ruption;118 and 
(7) the Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT), which is an ad-
visory team whose members include representatives from 
 
 114. See Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998 (S. Afr.). 
 115. See Memorandum of Understanding: Establishment of the National Anti-Corruption 
Forum 1999, available at http://www.nacf.org.za/about-nacf/index.html. 
 116. See DPSA in the Media: Launch of the Special Anti-Corruption Unit, DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA (Jan. 26, 2011). 
 117. Government: Perspectives on Anti-Corruption Initiatives in South Africa, NATIONAL 
ANTI-CORRUPTION FORUM [NACF], http://nacf.org.za/government/index.html. 
 118. Statement on the Cabinet Meeting Held on 18 November 2009 in Pretoria, INT’L 
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2009/cabinet1120.html 
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other anticorruption entities, including SARS, the NPA, and 
the SIU.119 
Although the presence of so many commissions, units and com-
mittees with overlapping mandates can be bewildering, it cannot be 
said that South Africa lacks the requisite institutions to enforce its an-
ti-corruption laws. 
C.  Public Administration in South Africa 
In keeping with the third component of the roadmap, South 
Africa has passed legislation designed to regulate and ensure trans-
parency in the administration of public affairs.120  The principal piece 
of legislation is the Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 
(PFMA).121  Passed to give effect to sections 213 through 219 of the 
Constitution, which deal with the management of national finances, 
the PFMA is designed to ensure that revenue, expenditure, assets and 
liabilities are managed efficiently; to set out the responsibilities of 
persons in government entrusted with financial management; and to 
codify corporate governance principles, such as transparency and 
accountability.122 
In particular, the PFMA provides that each governmental 
agency or entity must have an “accounting officer”123  responsible 
for risk management, auditing, procurement, evaluation of major 
capital projects, revenue collection, prevention of irregular and fruit-
less and wasteful expenditure, safeguarding of public assets, and em-
ployee discipline.124  The accounting officer is also required to 
submit projections for revenue, expenditure and borrowing, keep 
 
 119. For an overview of South Africa’s anticorruption efforts, see the Conference of the 
State Parties to the United Nations Convention on Corruption, Implementation Review 
Group, Fourth Session, 27-31 May 2013. For a review of the various committees and 
task forces, see the Basil Institute on Governance, South Africa Anti-Corruption Archi-
tecture (2012), at paragraph 4.3. 
 120. Pub. Protector Act 23 of 1994 § 6(g) (S.Afr.). 
 121. Pub. Fin. Mgmt. Act 1 of 1999 (S. Afr.). 
 122. Pub. Fin. Mmt. Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999 § 2 (stating that the objective of the Act is to 
“secure transparency, accountability, and sound management of the revenue, expendi-
tures, assets and liabilities of the institutions to which this Act applies”). 
 123. For “public entities,” including state-owned companies, the “accounting officer” is re-
ferred to as the “accounting authority,” and the role is filled by the board of directors.  
Id. a § 36, 49. 
 124. Id. at §§ 38(1)(a)(i-iv), 38(1)(c)(i), 31(1)(c)(ii), 38(1)(d), 39(1)(h). 
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proper financial records, and prepare financial statements and sub-
mit those statements and an annual report to the Auditor General 
and Treasury.125   The PFMA also creates the offense of financial 
misconduct, requiring persons in positions of authority with 
knowledge of any such offense to report it to the Auditor General and 
National Treasury.126 
Public procurement in South Africa, as per the constitution, 
must be carried out in accordance with a system that is “fair, equi-
table, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.”127  The PFMA 
empowers the National Treasury to promulgate a regulatory frame-
work for a “procurement and provisioning system” that reflects those 
values,128 and Treasury in turn has issued regulations requiring the 
use of a competitive bidding process for most contracts and permit-
ting other procurement methods only in limited circumstances.129  
South Africa allows for debarment of contractors convicted of cor-
ruption,130 and requires Treasury approval for all aspects of procure-
ment involved in public-private partnerships.131 
Finally, the Constitution of South Africa states that “a high 
standard of ethics must be promoted and maintained” in the public 
services,132 and establishes the Public Service Commission (PSC) for 
this purpose.133  The PSC is empowered to investigate, “monitor and 
evaluate the organi[z]ation and administration and the personnel prac-
tices of the public service,”134 and is required to “exercise its powers 
 
 125. Id. at § 40. 
 126. Id, at §§ 81, 85(1). 
 127. S. AFR. CONST., § 217(1). 
 128. PFMA § 76(4)(c).  The PFMA also contains freestanding rules about procurement, 
such as requiring Ministerial approval before a public entity can acquire a “significant” 
asset, and requiring public entities to ensure that their procurement systems reflect the 
constitutional principles.  Id. at §§ 51, 54. 
 129. Treasury Practice Note 8 of 2007/2008, at 3.4.1 (requiring accounting officers / author-
ities to obtain competitive bids for all procurement above R 500 000); South Africa al-
so requires that public procurement be used to address past injustices in terms of the 
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and implementing regula-
tions. 
 130. PCCA section 28(1)(a) and Treasury Regulation 16A9.1 to the PFMA. 
 131. Treasury Reg.: Issued in Terms of the Pub. Fin. Mgmt. Act of 2001 § 16.6 (2001) (S. 
Afr.) (requiring Treasury approval of procurement documents for any PPP). 
 132. S. AFR. CONST., §§ 195(1)(a), 196(1). 
 133. Id. at §196(1). 
 134. Id. at § 196(4)(b). 
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and perform its functions without fear, favor or prejudice.”135  The 
PSC was officially established under the Public Service Laws 
Amendment Act No. 47 of 1997, which promulgated the Code of 
Ethics in Public Service.  The Code sets forth standards of conduct 
for public officials, providing, for example, that public employees 
will put the public first and be faithful to the Republic and Consti-
tution.  With regard to corruption, the Code provides that a public 
employee “will recuse himself or herself from any official action or 
decision-making process which may result in improper personal 
gain . . . [and] shall report instances of fraud, corruption, nepotism, 
and maladministration prejudicial to the public interest to the ap-
propriate authorities.”136  There is also an Executive Ethics Code, 
published in the Executive Members’ Ethics Act No. 82 of 1998, 
which applies to Cabinet Members and Deputy Ministers, and pre-
vents them from acting in any way that is inconsistent with their po-
sition or “using their position or any information entrusted to them, to 
enrich themselves or improperly benefit any other person.”137 
D.  South Africa’s International Cooperation Commitments 
South Africa also has legislation in place addressing the fourth 
component of the roadmap: international cooperation with respect to 
corruption and related activity. 
Extradition is governed by the Extradition Act No. 67 of 1962, 
as amended by the Extradition Amendment Act No. 77 of 1996, 
which defines an extraditable offense as any offense that is punisha-
ble with a sentence of imprisonment for six months or more, both 
in South Africa and the requesting state.138  It empowers the Presi-
dent to enter into extradition agreements with other states, and pro-
vides that persons may be surrendered in accordance with terms of 
any such agreement, or in the  absence  of  such  an  agreement,  
with  Presidential  consent.  South Africa has executed extradition 
agreements with a number of states, including the United States, 
China, India, and Australia.  It is also a party to the SADC Protocol 
on Extradition, a multilateral agreement obliging state parties to ex-
 
 135. Id. at §196(2). 
 136. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Code of Conduct § 3.4 (S. Afr.). 
 137. Executive Members’ Ethics Bill § 2(2)(b)(iv) (1998) (S. Afr.). 
 138. Extradition Act 67 of 1962, § 1 (S. Afr.). 
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tradite any person within its jurisdiction wanted for an extraditable 
offense, defined as “offen[s]es that are punishable under the laws of 
both state parties by imprisonment . . . for a period of at least one 
year, or by a more severe penalty.”139 
In terms of legal assistance, South Africa has passed the Interna-
tional Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act No. 75 of 1996, which 
provides the framework for legal assistance, such as confiscation of 
the proceeds of crime and the transfer of evidence.140  It has exe-
cuted bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries, 
including the United States, Canada, Nigeria, France, India, China 
and Mozambique, and is party to multilateral agreements such as the 
SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance.141  Moreover, where 
South Africa does not have a mutual legal assistance agreement in 
place, the UNCAC itself may serve this function.142 
E.  Access to Information in South Africa 
The last component of the roadmap, the right to information, is 
addressed in section 32 of the Constitution, which states that “every-
one has the right of access to any information held by the state and 
any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights.”143   Legislation giving effect 
to this constitutional decree was passed in the form of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA), the stated pur-
pose of which is to “foster a culture of transparency and account-
ability in public and private bodies by giving effect to the right of 
access to information,” and to “actively promote a society in which 
the people of South Africa have effective access to information to en-
able them to more fully exercise and protect all of their rights.”144   
Under PAIA, if a request for information complies with the proce-
 
 139. S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Protocol on Extraditions §§ 2, 3. 
 140. Int’l Cooperation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996 (S. Afr.). 
 141. S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2002 §§ 
2, 3. 
 142. UNCAC 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
 143. S. AFR. CONST., § 32. 
 144. Promotion of Access to Info. Act (PAIA) 2 of 2000, Preamble (S. Afr.). 
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dural requirements, and does not fall under certain limited exemp-
tions, the public body must provide the requested information.145 
PAIA has been successfully invoked in South Africa to compel 
recalcitrant government entities to provide information.  For exam-
ple, in SA Metal & Machinery Co v Transnet,146 the applicant sought 
records related to tender proceedings, and Transnet, the state-owned 
company responsible for transportation infrastructure, resisted on the 
basis that such information contained confidential and commercially 
sensitive information.  The court rejected those arguments, ordering 
the production of the records.   Similarly, in De Lange et al v 
Eskom,147  the applicant sought documents relating to the pricing 
formulas contained in long-term bulk electricity purchase agreements 
between Eskom, the  s t a t e -owned  e lec t r i c  u t i l i ty ,  and Billi-
ton.148  The court agreed that Eskom could normally withhold cer-
tain commercial information for fear of harm from disclosure, but 
nonetheless ordered the production of records as being in the public 
interest, an exception permitted in section 46 of PAIA.149 
From even this cursory review of South Africa’s legal frame-
work for combating corruption, it is clear that South Africa has 
complied with the roadmap.  It has a thorough and far-reaching an-
ti-corruption statute in the PCCA, as well as the requisite ancillary 
laws and procedural rules; it has a comprehensive set of institutions 
focused on fighting corruption; it requires public entities to manage 
funds and procure goods and services in an open and transparent 
manner; it demonstrates commitment to cooperation at the interna-
tional level with its efforts in terms of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance; and it guarantees the public the right of access to infor-
 
 145. Per section 50 of the PAIA, private bodies must also provide information upon request, 
if that information is necessary for the exercise or protection of any right.  Id. at § 50. 
 146. SA Metal & Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd, [2003] 1 All SA 335 (W) (S. 
Afr.). 
 147. De Lange and Another v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others, [2012] (5) BCLR 502 (GSJ) 
(S. Afr.). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See also Mittalsteel SA v Hlatshwayo, [2006] SCA 94 (RSA).  In this case, Mittalsteel 
declined to produce records relating to labor relations when it was a state-owned enter-
prise (Iscor).  The court ordered disclosure of the records, reasoning that because Iscor 
was established by proclamation, controlled by state-appointed directors, and subject to 
regulation in terms of dividend and share issuance, it was subject to the State’s control 
and was thus a public body required to provide the requested information in terms of 
PAIA.  Id. at para. 24. 
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mation. Indeed, a many of the key components of the 
roadmap⎯management of public finances, procurement, codes of 
ethics, the right to information⎯are constitutionally protected 
values, fleshed out by implementing legislation. 
With all this sound and fury, one might expect that South Africa 
would have an extensive record of prosecuting corrupt officials, or 
would at least be a country on an upward trajectory in the fight 
against corruption.  Yet this has not proven to be the case. 
IV. THE TERRITORY: CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
FROM 1999 - 2014 
As detailed above, South Africa took immediate steps to combat 
corruption upon its emergence from apartheid in 1994.  Indeed, 
many of the key aspects of the anti-corruption roadmap, such as the 
right to information and open and competitive public procurement, 
were enshrined in South Africa’s new Constitution.   The country al-
so passed a spate of laws in the late 1990s to give substance to these 
rights, such as the Protected Disclosures Act, the Witness Protection 
Act, the National Prosecution Act, and the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act.  In the early 2000s, South Africa signed the 
UNCAC, passed a comprehensive statute outlawing corruption, the 
PCCA. 
Given all the attention devoted to the issue of corruption, and the 
implementation of the anti-corruption roadmap, one would have ex-
pected South Africa to be a leader in the fight against corruption.  In 
fact the opposite has occurred.  The Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”), which measures perceptions of 
corruption in the public sector in various countries, ranked South Af-
rica 38th out of all countries surveyed in 2001, and 73rd in 2013.   
Some of this decline is due to an increase in the number of countries 
surveyed but since 2010, when the number of countries leveled off at 
about 175, South Africa saw a steady decline from 54th in 2010, to 
64th in 2011, 69th in 2012, and 73rd in 2013.  The absolute corrup-
tion score given to South Africa has also declined from a high of 4.9 
in 2008 to 4.1 in 2013, meaning that corruption in South Africa is 
perceived to have increased both in comparison to other countries, 
and absolutely. 
A closer look reveals that at the very same time South Africa 
was making its many commitments to combat corruption, the country 
was wrought by a number of interrelated corruption scandals.  These 
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scandals led to vicious political infighting that resulted in, among 
other things, the forced resignation of then-deputy president Jacob 
Zuma, the suspension and ultimate dismissal of the head of the NPA, 
the conviction of the chief of police on charges of corruption, the 
disbanding of the specialized anti-corruption unit within the NPA, 
and relocation of that function to the South African Police Service. 
To contextualize these outcomes, it is necessary to briefly review 
the facts and circumstances surrounding four corruption-related con-
troversies in South Africa, with an eye toward the role and perfor-
mance of the various anti-corruption institutions, and the effective-
ness of the anti-corruption roadmap. 
A.  The Arms Deal 
The so-called “arms deal” refers to a package of defense-related 
purchases, also known as the Strategic Defense Procurement Packag-
es, made by South Africa in 1999.150  Pursuant to the deal, South Af-
rica acquired several submarines and frigates from a consortium led 
by the German firm Ferrostaal, thirty helicopters from the Italian 
manufacturer Agusta, twenty-four Hawk aircraft, twenty-eight Grip 
fighter jets from U.K. aerospace giant BAE, and other armaments, for 
a total purchase price of R 30 billion, although the actual price was 
later reported to be much higher.  The cost of the procurement was to 
be recouped, however, by a purported R100 billion in “offsets,” 
which were commitments by the successful bidders to invest in 
South Africa.151   The South African government also estimated that 
the arms deal would create 65,000 jobs.152 
 
 150. See CATHERINE COURTNEY, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION IN THE 
OFFICIAL ARMS TRADE at 4(e) (2002), available at http://archive.ti-
defence.org/publications/702-corruption-in-the-official-arms-trade. 
 151. Offsets are well known in the arms industry as a mechanism for concealing bribes. 
Transparency International has recommended that they be banned on the basis that 
“importing governments can use the offset package to justify awarding contracts to 
companies paying the largest bribes” and “complicated offset provisions can also con-
ceal commissions as payments are channeled through local firms, which can be chosen 
for their political connections.”  Id. 
 152. The actual cost ended up being much higher. See Glynnis Underhill, Another Arms 
Deal Commission Resignation Over “Second Agenda,” MAIL & GUARDIAN, Aug. 2, 
2013, available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-02-arms-deal-commission-lawyer-
resigned-over-second-agenda (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (stating that the arms deal 
cost between R40 billion and R70 billion). 
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The deal was controversial at the time, given the seeming low 
priority of arms for a new country that had little fear of invasion, 
especially compared to what were perceived as more critical 
measures for economic development, such as housing and infrastruc-
ture.  It became even  more  controversial  in  September  of  1999,  
when  Patricia  de  Lille,  then  a  member  of Parliament, alleged 
that the deal was tainted by corruption, and moved for a commission 
of inquiry.153 
An initial investigation by the Auditor General concluded that 
there had been “material deviations from accepted procurement 
practice,” and that the guarantees underlying the offsets were in-
sufficient.154  A parallel inquiry by the parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (“SCOPA”) found that the cost of the 
arms deal had already risen to R 43 billion, that the “offsets” could 
be avoided by a payment of 10% of the nominal value of the off-
set, and that the selection of the prime contractors was flawed, 
such as a decision that “led to the choice of a contractor who would 
not otherwise have been afforded the contract.”155  
The SCOPA report recommended that a formal investigation be 
launched under the auspices of a joint team consisting of the Audi-
tor General, the SIU, the Public Protector, the Investigating Direc-
torate for Serious Economic Offences, and the National Prosecut-
ing Authority.156   However, then-President Mbeki declined to issue 
a Presidential Proclamation necessary for the SIU to act, and there-
fore the investigation was undertaken by the other three entities on-
ly.157  These entities collectively would come to be known as the 
 
 153. SPECIAL REVIEW BY THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE SELECTION PROCESS OF THE 
STRATEGIC DEFENCE PACKAGES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ARMAMENTS AT THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE para. 6 (Sept. 16, 2000), available at http://www.armsdeal-
vpo.co.za/special_items/reports/ag_review.pdf. 
 154. Id. 
 155. STANDING COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, SPECIAL REVIEW OF STRATEGIC ARMS 
PURCHASES pars.a 2-5 (Oct. 30, 2000), available at http://www.armsdeal-
vpo.co.za/special_items/reports/SCOPA14thReport-01.pdf (additionally noting  that 
“the government had no influence regarding the appointment of the subcontractors.”) 
 156. Id. at para. 7. 
 157. See AUDITOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY, AND PUBLIC PROTECTOR, 
STRATEGIC DEFENCE PACKAGES JOINT REPORT para. 1.1.6.6 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter JIT REPORT].  The exclusion of the SIU was controversial and is alleged to have 
been part of an attempt by the executive to squash the investigation; however the SIU 
at the time was headed by Judge Heath, and the Constitutional Court had recently ruled 
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Joint Investigating Team, and published their report (the “JIT Re-
port”) in November of 2001.158 
The JIT Report revealed evidence of conflicts of interest at 
the highest levels.  For example, it related that the Chief of Acquisi-
tions for the Department of Defense, Chippy Shaik, who was “in con-
trol of policy matters and planning related to all acquisition matters,” 
participated in the awarding of a number of contracts to the German 
Frigate Consortium (GFC), African Defense Systems (ADS), and 
Thompson-CSF – companies that his brother Shabir Shaik owned, or 
had interests in.159  The report also detailed persistent failures to 
follow procurement policies,160  and stated cryptically that “certain 
allegations in connection with the involvement of the former Minister 
of Defen[s]e, in a company that was to benefit from the SDP pro-
curement, came to the attention of the investigation teams,” but that 
“this matter was not investigated during the public and forensic phas-
es of the investigation.”161 
In spite of these and other conclusions that appeared to point to 
misconduct,162 the JIT Report contained as one of its “key findings” 
 
in South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath et al, that a Constitu-
tional Court Judge could not head the SIU because the functions of an SIU-head are 
executive in nature, and incompatible with judicial office). South African Association 
of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath et al (CCT27/00) [2000], 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (28 
Nov 2000). 
 158. Id. 
 
 
159. JIT REPORT, supra note 164, at paras. 7.3.5.4(h),10.2.3, 10.4.1.1,10.4.2.1, 10.4.4.1. 
(stating that Shabir Shaik is the brother of Chippy Shaik, and listing companies that 
Shabir Shaik owns interests in, including Africa Defence Systems and Thompson-
CSF); 10.2.3 (confirming that African Defence Systems was considered a primary con-
tractor, and part of the successful German Frigate Consortium); 10.4.4.1 (stating that 
African Defence Systems was awarded the contract to build the Combat Suite for the 
Corvettes, and other contracts, and that it in turn awarded certain subcontracts to 
Thompson-CSF); 7.3.5.4(h) (stating that GFC was selected on the basis of its non-
industrial offset component of its bid, even though another bidder scored higher in 
terms of the critical minimum criteria, military value, price, and defence-related indus-
trial participation, and even though the non-industrial offsets themselves were “not as-
certainable in terms of achievability”. 
 160. Id. at paras. 10.2.3.3, 10.2.4.4. 
 161. Id. at paras. 10.4.5.8, 5. 
 162. Id. at para. 11.8.2.1 (concluding that the process that led to the awarding of the System 
Management System of the Combat Suite to ADS “indicates how a procurement sys-
tem can be manipulated”). 
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that “no evidence was found of any improper or unlawful conduct by 
government” and that “any irregularities and improprieties . . . 
cannot be ascribed to the President or the Ministers involved in their 
capacity as members of the Ministers’ Committee or Cabinet.”163   
The South African government then issued a statement that the re-
port “should lay to rest all kinds of allegations that were made 
against government,” and that “we are confident that the same enthu-
siasm that was shown in making these allegations, now found to lack 
substance, will manifest itself in ensuring that the public is informed 
of the actual state of affairs.”164 
Not only was the “key finding” nonsensical on its face, evi-
dence was mounting that other prominent politicians involved with 
the arms deal had either been engaged in corruption or had serious 
conflicts of interest.165  For example, Tony Yengeni, the chairman of 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense – the committee 
charged with evaluating the arms deal – had been arrested in October 
of 2001 and charged with corruption for improperly accepting bene-
fits, in the form of a 50% discount on a Mercedes 4x4, from one of 
the successful contractors.166  As a result, the JIT Report was widely 
discredited and viewed as a “whitewash,” or an effort to close the 
door on the investigation.167 
Nor was that the end of the matter.  In the years that fol-
lowed, further developments, and in particular the results of in-
ternational investigations into the multinational companies in-
volved in the arms deal, repeatedly arose.  These developments and 
investigations indicated that corruption had in fact occurred on a 
much larger scale than had initially been suspected, and rendered 
 
 163. Id. at paras. 14.1.1 (emphasis added). 
 164. Statement of the South African Government on the Joint Investigation Report into the 
Strategic Defence Procurement Packages para. 7 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at 
http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/special_items/statements/sa-gov_report.html (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2014). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Erika Gibson, Yengeni Arrest Sparks Panic, News24 (Oct. 3, 2001), available at: 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Yengenis-arrest-sparks-panic-20011003 (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2014). 
 167. Indeed, it has been asserted that the JIT Report itself was doctored at the behest of the 
executive to include the “key findings.” See PATRICK LAURENCE, DRAFT REPORTS 
IGNITE SMOLDERING EMBERS (2005), available at: http://hsf.org.za/resource-
centre/focus/issue-37-first-quarter-2005/draft-reports-ignite-smouldering-embers (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
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the “key finding” of the JIT Report increasingly farfetched. They in-
clude: 
(1) The conviction of Schabir Shaik, financial advisor to 
Jacob Zuma, in June 2005 in the Durban High Court for 
accepting payments on behalf of Zuma in exchange for in-
fluence.  One example was an agreement with the arms deal 
contractor Thint to pay R 500,000 per year to Zuma in 
exchange for protection from the arms deal inquiry.168  
(2) A 2007 investigation by the British Serious Fraud Office 
into BAE, which revealed that BAE employees had paid £ 
115 million in “commission” on the South African Deal, 
including tens of millions to Fana Hlongwane, the adviser to 
Defense Minister Joe Modise.169 
(3) An investigation into BAE by the U.S. State Department 
for violations of arms export laws; the charging letter from 
the US State department described BAE’s incorporation of 
an offshore company called “Red Diamond Trading,” the 
purpose of which was to make payments to “brokers” who 
in turn used the payments to influence decision-makers in 
the various foreign countries. The letter stated that Red Di-
amond had made payments in connection with the sale of 
jets to South Africa.170 
 
 168. Shaik v the State [2006] 1 SCA 134 (RSA) (affd. on appeal).  Schabir Shaik owns in-
terests in ADS, and Thompson-CSF, the companies that were awarded arms deal con-
tracts while Schabir’s brother Chippy was the head of procurement for the Department 
of Defence. 
 169. Evelyn Groenink, Who Got R 1 billion in Pay-Offs?, MAIL & GARDEN (Jan. 12, 2007), 
available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2007-01-12-arms-deal-who-got-r1bn-in-pay-offs 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014); see also, e.g., Stefaans Brummer & Sam Sole, How the 
Arms Bribes Were Paid MAIL & GARDEN (Dec. 5, 2008), available at: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2008-12-05-how-arms-deal-bribes-were-paid (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014); David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE’s Secret Money Machine, THE GUARDIAN, 
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/baefiles/page/0,,2095840,00.html (last visit-
ed Feb. 11, 2014). 
 170. U.S. State Department, Proposed Charging Letter re: Investigation into BAE Systems 
at 6, 10 (May 2011), available at: 
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/BAES_PCL.pdf 
(last visited 11 Feb 2014).  It is worth noting that neither the United States nor the U.K. 
has the high ground with respect to the investigation into BAE. In the UK, the Prime 
Minister intervened on grounds of national security to quash an investigation into al-
leged BAE bribery of public officials in Saudi Arabia. In the United States, the En-
 
The Map is Not the Territory  Vol. III, No. II 
 73 
(4) In 2011, forensic investigations conducted in connec-
tion with a German investigation into the company Ferro-
staal, indicating that bribes were paid to ensure the success 
of the German Consortium for the frigate and submarine 
contracts in South Africa.171 
(5) In 2012, Swedish television reported that Saab, a partic-
ipant in the BAE bid for the Gripen fighters, had paid 
bribes to the National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa for its backing on the arms deal.172 
(6) In 2013, German detectives reported that a raid on 
the offices of ThyssenKrupp, the German company that 
sold patrol corvettes to South Africa, reportedly revealed 
documents showing that Tony Yengeni signed a bribe 
agreement for R 6 billion.173 
In light of all this, in 2011, advocate Terry Crawford-Browne 
filed suit seeking to compel the government to launch a judicial 
commission of inquiry into the arms deal.174   Before the Court could 
rule, however, President Zuma announced that an inquiry would 
be instituted by a three-judge panel, to be headed by Judge Willie 
Seriti.175 
The Seriti Commission has itself been beset with by controver-
sies and delays.  In January of 2013, Judge Moabi stated that there is 
a “second agenda” at work in the Commission and that “I came to the 
Commission to serve with integrity, dignity, and truthfulness” and “I 
 
forcement Agencies meticulously avoided charging BAE with violation of the FCPA, 
and instead alleged only technical violations of arms exportation treaties, in order to 
avoid having to debar BAE, a major defence contractor to the U.S. government. 
 171. Revealed: Yengeni’s R6 million ‘Kickback’ Agreement, MAIL & GUARDIAN (June 14, 
2013), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-14-00-revealed-yengenis-r6-million-kickback-
agreement. 
 172. Saab Admits R 24 Million Bribe Paid to Clinch Arms Deal, MAIL & GUARDIAN (June 
16, 2011), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-16-saab-admits-r24million-
bribe-paid-to-clinch-arms-deal (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 173. Revealed: Yengeni’s R6 million ‘Kickback’ Agreement, MAIL & GUARDIAN (June 14, 
2013), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-14-00-revealed-yengenis-r6-
million-kickback-agreement (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 174. Complaint, In re Crawford-Browne and the President of the Republic of South Africa, 
(2012), Const. Ct. S. Afr.., available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/understanding-the-arms-deal—terry-
crawfordbrowne (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 175. Id. 
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cannot with a clear conscience pretend to be blind to what is going on 
at the Commission.”176 Moabi’s resignation was followed by the 
departure of researcher Kate Painting in March of 2013, who had 
been assisting the Commission and who stated that the independence 
of the Commission had been compromised,177 and then the unex-
plained resignation of Judge Francis Legodi in July 2013. 178 
B.  The Glenister Case 
Even as the arms deal controversy was unfolding, a separate 
struggle ensued regarding whether South Africa’s specialized anticor-
ruption investigation unit should continue to be situated within the 
National Prosecuting Authority, or whether it should be relocated to 
South African Police Service. 
As described above, pursuant to the NPA Act, No. 32 of 
1998, the Scorpions had been established and situated within the 
NPA, which is required to operate “without fear, favor or prejudice” 
according to section 179(4) of the Constitution.179  The Scorpions ini-
tiated a number of high profile investigations that resulted in criminal 
convictions for corruption, including those into Tony Yengeni, de-
scribed above, and Schabir Shaik and Jackie Selebi, discussed be-
low. The resulting prosecutions caused outrage among some mem-
bers of the ANC.180  On April 1, 2005, President Mbeki appointed 
Justice Sisi Khampepe to investigate and report on the role and 
location of the DSO.181 
 
 176. Letter from Hon. Norman Moabi to Hon. Willie Sereti (Jan. 7, 2013), available at: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/norman-moabis-resignation-letter-judge-willie-
seriti (lasted visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 177. Glynnis Underhill, Legodi Resigns From Arms Commission on Eve of Hearings, MAIL 
& GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-07-31-legodi-
resigns-from-arms-commission-on-eve-of-hearings (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 178. Glynnis Underhill, Another Arms Deal Resignation Over Second Agenda, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2013), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-08-02-arms-deal-
commission-lawyer-resigned-over-second-agenda (last visited Jan. 27, 2014). 
 179. S. Afr. Const. 1996 §179(4). 
 180. ANCYL Wants Scorpions Probed, Mail & Guardian (Oct. 15, 2007), available at: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2007-10-15-ancyl- wants-scorpions-probed (last visited Jan. 27, 
2014) (alleging that the DSO had a “political agenda” and accusing it of abusing its 
power). 
 181. Khampepe Commission of Inquiry Into the Mandate and Location of the Directorate of 
Special Operations, Final Report (Feb. 2006), available at 
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Justice Khampepe considered the basis for situating the DSO 
within the NPA rather than SAPS.  She concluded that the DSO had 
been placed within the NPA for four reasons: 1) SAPS was unable 
to deal with high-level crime; 2 )  SAPS was perceived to be ille-
gitimate in light of its apartheid-era past; 3) the need to recruit top-
level persons to the anti-corruption unit; and 4) the threat of corrup-
tion within SAPS itself.182  Khampepe concluded that this justification 
was “as valid today as it was at conception.”183   Khampepe rejected 
SAPS’ argument that section 199(1) of the Constitution, which says 
that South Africa should have a “single police force,” meant putting 
the DSO in the NPA was unconstitutional.184   To the contrary, he 
found that putting the DSO within the NPA was “constitutionally 
and jurisprudentially sound.”185 
Nonetheless, at a conference held by the ANC in Polokwane in 
2007 – the same conference where Mbeki was ousted as leader of the 
party – the ANC adopted a resolution that “the DSO (Scorpions) 
be dissolved” and that the “members of the DSO performing po-
licing functions must fall under the South African Police Ser-
vices.”186  Shortly thereafter, the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Act was passed, which removed the DSO from the NPA, 
along with the National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act of 
2008, which relocated it within SAPS and rechristened it as the DPCI 
(the “Hawks”).187 
Cape Town businessman Hugh Glenister challenged the legis-
lation.  The Constitutional Court upheld the challenge, ruling that 
the government was obliged, both by the Constitution and the inter-
national agreements to which South Africa is a party (such as the 
UNCAC, the AU Convention, and the SADC Protocol), to establish 
 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/khampepe/part1.pdf (last visited 27 Jan 
2014) [hereinafter Khampepe Report]. 
 182. Id. at para. 8.2. 
 183. Id. at para. 10.2. 
 184. Id. at para.12.1. 
 185. Id. at Executive Summary. 
 186. See Afr. Nat’l Cong. [ANC], 52nd Nat’l Conf. Res., Peace at Stability, paras 8-9 (Dec. 
20, 2007), available at: http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536 (last visited Jan. 27, 
2014). 
 187. South African Police Service Amendment Act 57 of 2008; National Prosecuting Au-
thority Amendment Act 56 of 2008 (S. Afr.). 
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and maintain an independent corruption-fighting agency.188  It then 
analyzed the structure of the newly minted DPCI and found the 
structural considerations rendered it vulnerable to political influ-
ence.189 
In particular, the Glenister Court registered its concern regarding 
remuneration and security of tenure of members of the DPCI, and 
also noted its “[grave] disquiet” stemming from the fact that the 
policy guidelines for the Hawks and the selection of national priority 
offenses would be determined by “a Ministerial Committee, which 
must include at least the Ministers for Police, Finance, Home Affairs, 
Intelligence and Justice, and may include any other Minister desig-
nated from time to time by the President.”190    Such a structure, the 
Court said, creates “a plain risk of executive and political influ-
ence on investigations and on the entity’s functioning.”191  Moreo-
ver, the Court noted that the Ministers themselves could also be the 
subject of investigation, meaning that they “oversee an anti-
corruption entity when of necessity they are themselves part of 
the operational field within which it is supposed to function.”192  It 
further found that the government is bound to take reasonable steps 
to promote and fulfill the Bill of Rights, and that establishing a non-
independent anticorruption investigation unit would be unreasona-
ble.193 
For these reasons the Glenister court declared the SAPSA Act 
to be unconstitutional.194  It suspended its order for eighteen 
months, however, on the grounds that there are many possible 
ways that a corruption-fighting unit could be structured within the 
constitutional mandate, and that as long as the unit is given the 
 
 188. Glenister v. the President of the Republic of South Africa, (2011) (3) SA 347 (CC), (7) 
BCLR 651 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 189. Id. at para. 208. 
 190. Id. at para. 228. 
 191. Id. at para. 229. 
 192. Id. at para. 232. 
 193. Id. at para. 232 (reasoning that, because section 231(2) of the Constitution provides 
that international agreements ratified by Parliament “bind the Republic,” it is unrea-
sonable for the state in terms of section 7(2) of the Constitution to create an anti-
corruption institution that is not independent). 
 194. Id. at para. 251. 
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necessary independence, the method chosen is a policy choice that 
can be made by the legislature.195 
The decision was lauded as a victory for the rule of law 
and judicial independence.196  However, in September of 2012, 
new legislation was passed that kept the Hawks within SAPS.  
While the day-to-day control by the minister was made more circum-
spect, it retained certain aspects of the original non-independent 
structure.  For example, it provided that the head of the Hawks would 
be appointed by the Minister.197   Mr. Glenister has challenged the 
2012 Act on the basis that the changes are only superficial and the 
potential for undue political influence remains.  As of this writing, 
the ruling on this case is still pending.198 
C.  The Corruption Case against Jacob Zuma 
In 2003, the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Bele-
lani Ngcuka, announced that it would prosecute Schabir Schaik, 
brother of Chippy Shaik and financial advisor to Jacob Zuma, for 
corruption, but not Zuma himself, because even though there was 
“prima facie case” against Zuma, the NPA was not confident it 
would win.199   Ngcuka would later explain in an affidavit that his 
statement was designed to explain why he was not prosecuting 
 
 195. Id. at paras. 65-67. 
 196. Edwin Cameron, Annual Herbert L. Bernstein Lecture in International and Compara-
tive Law: Constitutionalism, Rights and International Law: the Glenister Decision, 23 
DUKE J, COMP. & INT’L L. 389, 407-08 (2013) (describing the implication of the deci-
sion on South Africa’s “rule of law, democratic institutions and the separation of pow-
ers”). 
 197. South Africa Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012 (retaining the DPCI within 
SAPS and making only modest modifications to address the security of tenure and re-
muneration of the members of the unit). 
 198. Glenister has been hailed as a transcendent decision and as one that upholds the rule-
of-law in South Africa.  See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 201 (describing the decision as 
“one of the most significant decisions on government accountability in post-apartheid 
South Africa”). However, the legislation has merely been amended again, and mean-
while the anti-corruption unit has been in limbo for six years. 
 199. See Empangeni Muji, Ngcuka Can’t Have it Both Ways, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 31. 
2003, available at http://www.armsdeal-vpo.co.za/articles04/both_ways.html (arguing 
that “if his investigation establishes a prima facie case, he must prosecute Zuma. If the 
case cannot be won, then there is no prima facie case against Zuma”). 
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Zuma despite the comprehensive evidence that would emerge 
against him in the course of the trial against Schabir Shaik.200 
At the time, however, Ngcuka’s statement, which came before 
Schaik was convicted, was perceived as a political ploy to discredit 
Zuma, who in his capacity as Deputy President would be a threat 
t o then-President Mbeki.201  Zuma responded by threatening to bring 
charges in defense of his reputation, and the Public Protector issued a 
report stating that the allegations against Zuma violated his right to 
human dignity.202  Parliament adopted the Public Protector’s report, 
and Ngcuka resigned.203 
However, the investigation against Schabir Shaik continued,204 
and he was ultimately convicted of corruption, and specifically for 
 
 200. Affidavit of Mr. Ngcuka at para 8, State v. Zuma, (2005) Case No. 358 / 2005 (CC), 
available at 
http://www.armsdealvpo.co.za/special_items/jacob_zuma_trial/affidavit_ngcuka.html 
(“At the time when I prepared my announcement, I was in possession of a draft in-
dictment against, inter alia, Schabir Shaik. In this indictment, reference was of necessi-
ty made to his relationship with [Zuma] and the bribe agreement with Thetard. This in-
dictment spelled out, far more eloquently than my statement, what was clearly a prima 
facie case of corruption against Accused No 1. I knew that this document would be in 
the public domain when the draft charge sheet was served on Shaik on the following 
Monday. What I felt obliged to explain to the public, therefore, was the reason why, 
despite the prima facie case disclosed by the indictment, I had nevertheless come to the 
conclusion that I was not able to prosecute [Zuma].”) 
 201. Andre Koopman, Zuma up in Arms Over Scorpion Sting, INDEP. ONLINE (July 28, 
2003) http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-up-in-arms-over-scorpions-sting-
1.110288#.VTrAHmRViko. 
 202. African Nat’l Cong., ANC Sends Letter of Complaint Against NPA to Public Protector 
(Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5819. 
 203. Anele ka Nene, Ngcuka Resignation a Pity, INDEP. ONLINE (July 25, 2004) 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ngcuka-resignation-a-pity-da-
1.217994#.VTrCzWRViko. 
 204. Shortly after the charges were filed against Shaik, a complaint was filed by Mac 
Maharaj and Schabir Shaik alleging that the head of the NPA (Ngcuka) had been a spy 
for the former apartheid government.  This was duly investigated by the Hefer Com-
mission of Enquiry, which found that “Messrs Maharaj and Shaik’s allegations of spy-
ing have not been established.  Mr Ngcuka probably never acted as an agent for the 
pre-1994  government.”   
JJF HEFER, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF SPYING AGAINST THE NATIONAL 
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, MR BT NGCUKA, para.  88  (Jan. 7, 2004),  availa-
ble  at  
http://www.justice.gov.za/commissions/comm_hefer/2004%2001%2020_hefer_report.pdf.  
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accepting bribes on behalf of Zuma.205  In particular, the trial court 
judgment (subsequently affirmed on appeal) states that Shaik “gra-
tuitously made some 238 separate payments of money, either directly 
to or for the benefit of Mr. Jacob Zuma, who held high political of-
fice throughout this period”206  and that,  
[A] total sum of R1 340 078 was so paid to Jacob Zuma, 
and the State claims that this was done corruptly, the object 
being to influence Zuma to use his name and political influ-
ence for the benefit of Shaik’s business enterprises or as an 
ongoing reward for having done so from time to time.207    
After the decision, in February 2005, President Mbeki asked for 
Zuma’s resignation, which Zuma then tendered.208  Charges were filed 
against Zuma, but in 2006 the court struck the case from the rolls on 
the basis that the prosecution was unprepared.209  In 2007, at the Po-
lokwane conference, Zuma was elected head of the ANC,210 and on 
December 28 of the same year, he was indicted for corruption.211  
These charges were dismissed in August of 2008, and then rein-
stated on appeal in January of 2009.212 
Finally, on April 6, 2009, the acting head of the NPA, Moketedi 
Mpshe, released a statement that charges against Zuma would be 
dropped.213  Somewhat bizarrely, it quickly emerged that large por-
 
 205. State v. Shaik, (2005), Case No. 27/04 (CC), para.. 5 (transcript of judgment read by 
Judge Squires 
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/cis/omalley/OMalleyWeb/03lv03445/04lv04
015/05lv04148/06lv04149.htm); aff’d (2007) 2 All SA 9. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at para.. 5. 
 208. Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement by the Honourable Jacob Zuma on the Deci-
sion Taken by the President of the Republic, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2005/zuma0614.htm (last updated Jun. 14, 
2005). 
 209. Laurie Gauring, Corruption Case Ends for S. Africa Politician, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 21, 
2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-09-21/news/0609210106_1_jacob-
zuma-deputy-president-south-africa. 
 210. Barry Bearak, South Africa Drops Charges Against Leading Presidential Contender, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/africa/07safrica.html. 
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tions of Mpshe’s statement were copied from a 2002 judgment is-
sued by a Hong Kong court, which itself had been overturned.214  
This was followed by an entirely separate legal proceeding in which 
the opposition party, the DA, challenged the dropping of the charges, 
and the government argued that the DA lacked standing and that the 
decision was non-reviewable.215  
D.  Conviction of Jackie Selebi / Dismissal of Vusi Pikoli 
In 2006, the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, 
Vusi Pikoli opened an investigation into the National Commissioner 
of Police, Jackie Selebi, on the grounds that he had passed on to 
members of an organized crime syndicate certain information re-
lated to a murder investigation.216 The investigation required access 
to documents and material in the custody of SAPS, which SAPS re-
fused to provide to the DSO,217 in part because the DSO refused to 
disclose “what, and with respect to whom, the investigation re-
late[d].”218  Unable to secure the documents in this way, Pikoli ob-
tained an arrest warrant for Selebi on September 10 ,  2007, and a 
search and seizure warrant on September 14, 2007.219 
Pikoli informed then-President Mbeki that the warrants had been 
issued.  Mbeki responded by instructing the Minister of Justice by 
letter to “obtain the necessary information from [Pikoli] regarding 
the intended arrest and prosecution of [Selebi].”220  The next day, 
the Minister sent a letter to Pikoli demanding that he turn over “all 
of the information on which you rely to take the legal steps to effect 
the arrest of and the preference of charges against the National 
Commissioner of the police services,” and “until I have satisfied 
 
 214. James Myburgh, Did Mpshe Plagiarise a Hong Kong Judge, POLITICSWEB (Apr. 14, 
2009), http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/did-mpshe-plagiarise-a-hong-
kong-judge. 
 215. Pretoria News, Rule of Law at Risk in Zuma Spy Tapes Fight, INDEP. ONLINE (Nov. 9, 
2012), http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/rule-of-law-at-risk-in-zuma-spy-tapes-fight-
1.1420300 (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 216. FRENE GINWALA, REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO THE FITNESS OF VP PIKOLI TO HOLD 
THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS para. 244 (Nov. 4, 2008) 
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myself that sufficient information and evidence does exist . . . you 
shall not pursue the route that you have taken steps to pursue.”221 
Pikoli responded with a letter stating that, if it were taken literal-
ly, the Minister’s letter would be an instruction not to proceed with 
a prosecution, and therefore an unconstitutional violation of the in-
dependence of the NPA.222  He qualified this, however, by stating 
that “from my interaction with you I am confident that this is not 
your intention . . . I would urge that we meet urgently to discuss this 
matter and to clarify it.”223  The Minister responded by reiterating 
her request for a full report, which Pikoli then provided.224  On Sep-
tember 23, Pikoli met separately with both the Minister and Presi-
dent Mbeki, each of whom requested his resignation, which he re-
fused to provide.225 On September 2 4 ,  2007, President Mbeki sus-
suspended Pikoli on the basis that the relationship between Pikoli 
and Minister Mabandla has irretrievably broken down.226 
As described above, however, in terms of the NPA Act 32 of 
1998, the President can only “provisionally” suspend the NPA, pend-
ing an inquiry into his or her fitness, and only then for misconduct, 
ill-health, incapacity to carry out the duties of the office efficiently, 
or if he or she is “no longer a fit and proper person to hold the of-
fice.”227  Accordingly, on September 28, 2007, President Mbeki ap-
pointed Frene Ginwala, a former speaker of the National Assem-
bly, to head a commission of inquiry into Pikoli’s fitness to hold 
office.228 
The terms of reference for the Ginwala commission were to in-
vestigate and determine whether Pikoli was a “fit and proper person” 
to be entrusted with office of head of the NPA, in light of the alleged 
 
 221. Id. at para. 266 (emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at para. 268. 
 223. Id. at paras. 268, 286. 
 224. Id. at para. 269. 
 225. Id. at para. 274-75. 
 226. Id. at para. 277.  The letter of suspension also alleged that Pikoli should not have en-
tered into plea bargains with members of organised crime syndicates.  Id. 
 227. NPA Act 32 of 1998 § 12(6)(a) (S. Afr.).  The NPA Act also protects the head of the 
NPA by providing for a ten-year tenure, ensuring that his or her salary must be no low-
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breakdown in his relationship with the Minister.229  However, the 
government’s submission contained a number of additional allega-
tions, including that Pikoli should not have entered into certain 
other plea bargains, that he should not have sought to have the DSO 
treated as a “public entity” under the PFMA, and that he failed to 
account to the DGs for Justice and Constitutional Development to 
the extent required.230 
In December 2008, after conducting eleven days of hearings and 
collecting documentary evidence, Ginwala issued a 218-page report, 
which concluded that the allegations against Pikoli were unfounded 
and that there was no basis for the suspension.231  The report is large-
ly a vindication of Pikoli, and states on multiple occasions that Gin-
wala found him to be a man of “unimpeachable integrity.”232   The 
report concludes, inter alia, that the government had failed to sup-
port the basis for his suspension,233  that there was no irretrieva-
ble breakdown in the relationship between Pikoli and Minister,234 
and that the letter to Pikoli from the Director General of Justice, 
Menzi Simelane, instructing him not to arrest Selebi was unlaw-
ful.235  The Ginwala Report also goes out of its way, in multiple plac-
es, to criticize Simelane for being untruthful, making spurious and 
unfounded allegations against Pikoli, and for showing “disregard and 
lack of appreciation and respect of the import of an Enquiry estab-
lished by the President.”236 
The report did conclude, however, that Pikoli should have ac-
ceded to a request from the President to wait an additional two 
weeks before proceeding to obtain the warrants, for the purposes 
of avoiding a national crisis.237   On that basis, President Motlan-
the, having succeeded Mbeki after Mbeki’s “recall” by the ANC and 
subsequent resignation in 2008, declined to reinstate Pikoli, a deci-
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sion endorsed by Parliament in February of 2009.238  Pikoli 
launched a legal challenge seeking reinstatement, and on August 11, 
2009, he was granted an interdict preventing Zuma from appointing a 
successor.239  Shortly thereafter, Pikoli settled with the government 
for R 7.5 million.240 
The postscript to the Selebi / Pikoi affair is telling.  In Novem-
ber of 2009, President Zuma appointed Simelane, the Director Gen-
eral of Justice criticized in the Ginwala Report, as the new head of 
the NPA.241  (The appointment was challenged in court, and Constitu-
tional Court would subsequently rule that he was unfit for the 
post.)  In July 2010, Selebi was in fact convicted of corruption 
and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.242 
V. HOW THE ROADMAP FAILED IN SOUTH AFRICA 
What is remarkable about the events described in Part IV is that 
they occurred in parallel with the erection of the framework for com-
bating corruption prescribed by the anti-corruption roadmap dis-
cussed in Part III. That is to say, the laws and institutions discussed 
in Part III should have prevented the corruption scandals described in 
Part IV, or at least dealt with them much more effectively.  To un-
derstand why this did not occur, this section considers these 
events through the lens of the anti-corruption roadmap. 
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A.  Anticorruption Law – Not Applied 
With respect to the first aspect of the roadmap, the anti-
corruption law itself, it is apparent that the PCCA was underused, if 
not disregarded altogether.  For example, the PCCA specifically de-
fines the offense of “corrupt activities relating to agents” as being 
committed by any person who “accepts…any gratification from an 
agent in order to act in any manner that is improper or that amounts 
to the abuse of authority or violation of trust.”243  The conviction of 
Schabir Shaik for collecting corrupt payments as the agent of Jacob 
Zuma would appear to be proof of Zuma’s commission of this of-
fense; yet no prosecution occurred.244 
In addition, as described in Part III, the PCCA calls for the de-
barment of companies involved in corrupt activities245 and allows for 
the cancellation of contracts affected by fraud and corruption.246  
Yet despite ample evidence of such activities, none of the major 
contractors that participated in the arms deal were blacklisted, nor 
were any of the large contracts cancelled.247 
B.  Anticorruption Institutions – Not Independent 
Turning to the second component of the roadmap, independent 
enforcement institution, it appears that neither the NPA, responsible 
for prosecution, nor the Scorpions, responsible for execution, were 
able to remain independent and above the political fray. 
The treatment and track records of the various heads of the NPA 
are illustrative: the first head of the of the NPA, Ngcuka, was forced 
to resign after stating that a “prima facie” case existed against Zuma, 
even though Zuma’s adviser was convicted of accepting bribes on 
his behalf;248 the second head of the NPA, Pikoli, was suspended 
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after obtaining warrants to search and arrest the National Commis-
sioner of Police, and was not reinstated even though the Ginwala 
commission of inquiry vindicated him, and the Police Commissioner 
was in fact convicted of corruption;249  the third head  of  the  NPA 
(Mpshe)  announced,  two  weeks  before  the presidential election, 
that charges against Zuma would be dropped, in a decision that 
turned out to be largely plagiarized from a judgment from a court in 
Hong Kong;250  the fourth head of the NPA, Simelane, was found 
unfit to serve by the Constitutional Court. 
The anti-corruption investigative unit fared no better.  As de-
scribed above, South Africa had initially determined to situate the 
Scorpions within the NPA, and when this decision was challenged it 
was fully supported by the Khampepe commission of inquiry.251  
Nonetheless, the unit was disbanded pursuant to an ANC resolution 
and replaced with the Hawks, who were situated within the Police.252  
The fact that the Constitutional Court barred this maneuver under 
Glenister is laudable, and a point for the rule of law and judicial 
independence.  However the most recently proposed amendment 
makes few changes, and whatever the ultimate outcome, the unit has 
been effectively situated within the police for the last seven years. 
Other institutions also failed to function effectively.   The SIU, 
for example, was removed from the arms deal investigation and, 
unable to act without a Presidential proclamation, never participat-
ed in the investigation of the arms deal.253   The Public Protector and 
Auditor General both participated in the JIT Report, thus appearing to 
take the position that there was no improper conduct on the part of 
government; neither has seen fit to launch an independent investiga-
tion.254    Moreover, none of the commissions, task forces, ministerial 
committees, or other groups played a serious role in combating cor-
ruption on the ground. 
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C.  Administration of Public Entities and Funds – Not 
Effective 
The South African law provisions governing the administration 
of public funds and the behavior of public officials have also proven 
insufficient in dealing with corruption, particularly with the arms 
deal. 
First, with respect to procurement, the arms deal was far from 
“fair, equitable and transparent,” as required by the Constitution and 
the legislation described above.255  To the contrary, it appears the pro-
curement process was manipulated, in that the need for the arms in 
the first place was not well established; various bidders were includ-
ed despite not meeting the minimum qualifications, and were later 
selected even though they were more expensive; subcontracts were 
not put out to tender;  “offsets” were used as the basis for selection in 
spite of the absence of any guarantee that the promised benefits 
would materialize; and, the cost of the deal itself was dramatically 
understated.256 
The Public Service Commission and its Code of Ethics also 
failed to impact the conduct of the public servants involved.  Certain-
ly none of these public servants – Selebi, the Commissioner of Po-
lice, M o d i s e ,  the Minister of Defense, Y e n g e n i ,  a member of 
Parliament, and Zuma ,  the Deputy-President (Zuma) – can be said 
to have satisfied the Code of Ethics, nor did the Public Service 
Commission effectively investigate any of the matters described 
above. 
D.  International Cooperation – Assistance Not Requested 
As discussed above, numerous other jurisdictions launched in-
vestigations that ultimately shed light on corrupt activities in South 
Africa, including investigations by the United Kingdom and the 
United States into BAE, by German authorities into Ferrostaal, and 
by Swedish authorities regarding Saab.257  Further, in terms of t h e  
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UNCAC, state parties – including all of the states implicated 
above: South Africa, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Sweden – are obliged to provide the broadest possi-
ble mutual legal assistance to one another regarding cases of corrup-
tion.258   Each of these states is also a party to the OECD Conven-
tion, and each is thereby bound to assist one another “to the fullest 
extent possible,” and to provide “prompt and effective legal assis-
tance to another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations and 
proceedings brought by a Party concerning [corruption].”259 
Yet South Africa does not appear to have made any formal re-
quests for legal assistance to Germany, Sweden, the United King-
dom, or the United States, each of which had conducted extensive in-
dependent investigations and compiled substantial evidence. 
Instead, the arms deal investigation was halted, not by the head of 
the NPA, which normally would determine this, but by the head of 
the Hawks (now sitting within the Police, not the NPA) on the basis 
that the Germany would not cooperate.260 The arms deal investigation 
is precisely the type of case, involving multinational companies and 
offshore special purpose vehicles, that the mutual legal assistance 
agreements and laws related to asset seizure and money laundering 
are designed to address.  Nonetheless, South Africa did not invoke 
them. 
E.  Access to Information – Good, But Not Enough 
The criterion of “access to information” is the aspect under 
which South Africa performed the best.   Although the government 
occasionally resisted or delayed releasing a given report or docu-
ment, the information largely seems to have made its way into the 
public domain, allowing for a relatively public discourse about all of 
the above topics. 
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The arms deal, for example, was the subject of extensive me-
dia coverage and there have been several books on the issue.  Indeed, 
many of the sources cited in this article are publicly available from 
the government or on the Internet, including the various reports is-
sued by commissions of inquiry, and articles published by media 
sources such as the Mail & Guardian. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s experience over the past twenty years show that 
mere passage of laws and establishments of institutions – that is, 
mere adherence to the letter of the anti-corruption roadmap – is in-
sufficient to eradicate corruption.  Of course, this begs the more sig-
nificant question: why? 
That question is unfortunately beyond the scope of this pa-
per.  There are innumerable factors one could point to, or angles 
from which to consider the problem, the corrupt legacy imprinted by 
South Africa’s apartheid past; a white-owned media telling a story 
about corruption in black South Africa; a winner-take-all power 
struggle between Zuma and Mbeki; a lack of so-called “political 
will” amongst the leaders involved; an overwhelming need on the 
part of the ANC to consolidate power; overtones of tribalism be-
tween Zulus and Khosa; the worldwide corruption of the arms trade 
generally; the risks associated with a de facto one-party state vs. the 
checks and balances inherent in a multi-party state; the inability or 
unwillingness of the people of South Africa to directly hold their 
leaders accountable, and so forth.  However, the clear lesson seems 
to be that there is no magic bullet, no guarantee against corruption, 
and no “roadmap” that leads inexorably to its eradication. 
Still, the battle is a worthy one.  Of the many ills attributable to 
corruption, perhaps the most insidious is the steady dissolution, and 
increasing skepticism and fatigue of a populace that slowly loses 
faith in the honesty of its leaders.  South Africa appears to be in 
the throes of such a decline in confidence and faith, but perhaps 
some comfort can be found in the fact that if a new set of leaders 
were to arise, the laws and institutions to fight corruption are al-
ready in place, the roadmap ready to be followed, this time hopefully 
to a better end. 
 
